Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

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THE 1989 CIIPS PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

SECURITY, ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENCE: PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN CANADA

by Michael Driedger & Don Munton

December 1989

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PREFACE

Each year the Institute commissions, funds, and publishes a survey of Canadian public opinion in the area of international peace and security. This series began with a poll conducted in 1987. The questions that make up these surveys are designed by Don Munton, of the University of British Columbia, and Institute staff. The polling is carried out by Longwoods Research Group in Toronto.

The analysis of results presented in the text is that of the authors and does not necessarily represent the views of the Institute and its Board of Directors.

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INTRODUCTION

The following report presents the third in a series of surveys on Canadians' opinions on international issues. This series has been sponsored by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. The first of these surveys, carried out in the summer of 1987, focused on Canadians' views of the superpowers and the East-West conflict, and explored concerns about possible threats to peace and security. The second, based on a survey of Canadians during June and July of 1988, returned to some of those questions and also probed attitudes concerning Canadian defence policy and the future of arms control and disarmament. This third survey, following on from some of the results of the previous two, focuses on alternative threats to peace and security, other than the traditional Cold War animosities, as well as looking again at Canadians' changing perceptions of the superpowers and at some Canadian defence policy issues.

The focus on alternative threats to security was chosen in part because of the relative lack of concern expressed by Canadians about "the Soviet threat," at least as conventionally defined. The choice was also based in part on a recognition of various fundamental forces that have been reshaping contemporary international politics in the past few years.

Among these major international trends are a few that stand out. East-West relations are improving. The Gorbachev reforms underway in the Soviet Union have begun to influence the Warsaw Pact allies. Arms control is progressing in both the nuclear and conventional spheres. Local and regional conflicts -- in Central America, in southern Africa, in southeast Asia -- are ending or at least winding down. The USSR has withdrawn from Afghanistan and the US is withdrawing from its position of support for the Nicaraguan contras. The agenda of international politics, generally, is shifting from long-standing concerns about armed aggression and military security to greater attention to more prosaic problems -- trade protectionism, Third World debt, refugees, the international drug traffic, and the deteriorating ozone layer, for example.

These trends and shifts have been discussed in meetings as disparate as those of the Economic Summit and the Commonwealth, and reflected in the front and business pages of the world's press. They have been discussed and advocated in various international reports by expert panels including the Brandt Commission report on international development prospects, the Palme Report on common security, and, more recently, the

World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland report). What is less clear is the manner in which, and extent to which, the perceptions of threats and security of the world's citizens are also changing, if at all.

The Survey

The 1989 national public opinion survey, as the ones conducted in 1987 and 1988, was commissioned and funded by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and designed by Don Munton. Comprising 83 individual questions in all, the survey was carried out in September and October 1989 by the Longwoods Research Group, with a national sample selected randomly to be representative of Canadian households and chosen from a panel of 30,000 households maintained by Market Facts, Ltd. A total of 890 people responded to the questionnaire which was conducted by mail in both English and French. The response rate was 50%. (By comparison, the 1987 survey, which was conducted in part during a mail service strike in Canada, had a response rate of 48%, while the 1988 poll, shorter than this year's and answered by about half of those who had answered the 1987 survey, had a response rate of 63%.) The margin of error with samples of this size is approximately +/- 3%, 95 times out of 100.

Purpose and Format

The purpose of the present paper, as for the ones produced in conjunction with the 1987 and 1988 surveys, is not to try to explore broadly Canadian public opinion with respect to the range of current issues, nor to summarize the results of recent surveys in Canada on international issues. Rather, the purpose is to present and describe the results of this particular survey. The format of the paper can be outlined briefly.

The paper examines first the perceptions of military threats to Canada and to global peace and security -- and again suggests that some old myths need to be shed. It looks specifically at perceptions of the possibility of nuclear war and a superpower confrontation. It then shifts to consider other possible threats, such as economic and environmental problems, and reveals some startling developments in public attitudes. The 1989 opinion survey provides some of the first evidence that "international security" has come to mean something quite different to the present generation of Canadians -- a set of

concerns at once broader and more fundamental than physical security from military attack.

Perceptions of the United States and the Soviet Union are examined again, and the 1989 results largely confirm what the 1987 and 1988 surveys found: a striking shift in Canadians' views of both superpowers, and particularly of the United States, from that which existed twenty-five years ago. The 1989 responses also show that Canadians views of both superpowers are becoming less negative. The paper then turns to focus on some specific international policies Canadians favour, and in some cases, advocate, to deal with the perceived threats to their security and the danger of war. These include, for example, the idea of a comprehensive test ban, of reducing short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, of "non-provocative defence" or "defensive-defence," and of Canadian military commitments to Europe and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The level of support for Canadian defence and development assistance expenditures is also noted.

Finally, the internal cleavages, the important differences in attitudes among various groups of Canadians, will be considered. These differences are most notable with respect to language, region, gender, age and income. Such demographic differences, however, seem in some ways less striking than the substantive nature of the perceptions and attitudes themselves. Appendix B comprises tables of the cross-tabulations for these demographic factors with the attitudinal questions where there was a significant difference in the responses across the demographic groups.

All of the questions on the 1989 survey and the breakdown of responses to each are listed in Appendix A of this working paper. Note that both the percentages in the appendix and those cited in the text exclude "don't know" and "no answer" responses and are rounded off to the nearest percentage point. Thus the responses for any one question may total more than 100%.

PERCEPTIONS OF MILITARY THREATS

After more than forty years without direct, armed superpower conflict and amid a transformation of East-West relations in the late 1980s, military threats in general now occupy a less prominent place in the minds of Canadians. Consistent with this transformation and the emergence of a new global agenda, and perhaps also a cause of it, is a

declining sense of the likelihood of war and declining perceptions of particular military threats. As shown in previous CIIPS polls, few Canadians today regard a Soviet attack as likely and fewer think a world war or nuclear confrontation as likely as was the case a few years ago.

Asked in each of the last three years what is the greatest military threat to world peace, Canadians provide responses that are strikingly consistent. (See Table 1.) Few see Soviet actions as the greatest threat (5%), and as many or more point to US actions (9%). Most regard regional conflicts or nuclear proliferation as the greatest threats (25% and 40% respectively). The remaining 21% chose the arms race. The only likely significant shifts over the three year period have been a 10% increase in those citing nuclear proliferation as important and a slight decrease in the number pointing to the superpower arms race.

Table 1 Greatest Military Threat to World Peace

	1987	1988	1989
Soviet actions	5%	5%	5%
American actions	8%	11%	9%
Arms race	27%	23%	21%
Nuclear proliferation	29%	32%	40%
Regional conflicts	31%	28%	25%
	100%	99%	100%

Sources: CIIPS surveys, 1987, 1988, 1989. The question wording and response categories in 1989 differed slightly. The totals do not always add up to 100% due to rounding.

Considered without any comparison with other issues, the chances of a nuclear war within ten years is felt to be minimal by Canadians, with only 19% indicating that nuclear war is likely or very likely within a decade. One quarter (25%) think a nuclear war very unlikely, while a majority (56%) finds it unlikely. Confidence in a decade free of nuclear conflict has probably increased since last year's CIIPS poll in which 30% were

anticipating nuclear war within twenty-five years, although part of the difference may be due to the shorter time span used in this year's question. (See Figure 1.)

This pattern is entirely consistent with that revealed in the answers Canadians have provided on a number of polls in the past decade to the question of whether there is now more or less chance of a nuclear war than "ten years ago." The proportion saying "greater" has declined from two in three Canadians in the early 1980s to less than one in three on the 1988 CIIPS survey. (See Table 2.)

Table 2 Chance of Nuclear War Compared to Ten Years Ago

	1982	1987	1988
greater	65%	44%	27%
same	14%	31%	26%
less	17%	25%	46%
	96%	100%	99%

Sources: Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, 1982 survey; CIIPS surveys, 1987, 1988. The totals do not always add up to 100% due to non-responses and rounding.

Canadians may feel more secure with a world in which major power belligerency seems much less likely, but that does not mean they perceive no threats. Fears associated with the possession of nuclear weapons by countries other than those in NATO or Warsaw Pact are, in fact, the most pressing. This pattern emerges most clearly when respondents are asked about the ways in which nuclear weapons might come into use. There are three distinct scenarios as identified by a technique called "factor analysis" which analyzes the inter-relationships among responses to a given set of questions.

One, the "unconventional" scenario, foresees their use by terrorists or by a non-great power state involved in a regional conflict. This is regarded by most Canadians as the best (or worst) bet. The use of nuclear weapons by terrorists is judged as likely or very likely by 75% of respondents, while 69% think their use in a regional conflict is likely to some degree within their lifetime.

A second -- the "accidental nuclear war" scenario -- is the possibility of nuclear missiles being fired by mistake or of a nuclear equipment failure. This is thought to be of importance by fewer people -- 45% to be exact -- than foresee the use of nuclear weapons by forces not belonging to the superpowers.

The third, or "superpower" scenario, includes the conventional Cold War possibilities -- a surprise attack on Europe or the United States and that of a regional conflict escalating into a superpower nuclear exchange. These are perceived to be the least likely chain of events. For the nuclear attack arising out of superpower involvement in regional disputes, 32% say it is likely or very likely. Only 27% feel this way about a Soviet invasion of Europe escalating to nuclear war while 20% regard an attack on the United States as likely to some degree. Fully 83% believe that the USSR will <u>not</u> attack the US with nuclear weapons.

In a similar vein, few perceive the USSR to be a growing military threat and a "real, immediate danger" to North America, either conventional or nuclear. Only one-sixth (17%) agree with this view. Over 80% say it is not such a threat. A little more than two years after the release of the Canadian government's June 1987 Defence White Paper, Canadians seem even less convinced of the theme, stated in that paper, that an attack from the Soviet Union is the greatest threat to Canadian security.

Furthermore, most respondents appear to think recent events have given a clear enough indication that the USSR is, in fact, changing. There is, at any rate, a decline in the perceived degree of the threat from that particular superpower. Almost six in ten (57%) find the Soviet Union less of a threat than it was a few years ago. Only one-third (33%) argue that this threat has not changed, and less than one in ten think it has increased.

The trend toward improved East-West relations evident in the now numerous Gorbachev summits with Western leaders (Reagan, Thatcher, Kohl, Mitterand and, most recently, Mulroney and Bush) is also evident in the view of most Canadians (66%) that there will be increased cooperation among major countries in the future. Less than one-quarter (23%) think there will be no change in the atmosphere of international relations, and the other 12% have a more pessimistic opinion.

However hopeful this majority view may be, Canadians -- perhaps from long and bitter historical experience -- remain skeptical about the prospects of permanent peace in Europe. With no reference to any cause, respondents were asked whether a conventional war in Europe is now impossible. Most (60%) disagree. The rest (40%) agree it is impossible, but only a handful (5%) agree strongly.

While conventional Cold War impressions of the Soviet Union are changing, Canadians are not yet willing to declare the Cold War over. While one in six (15%) reject the idea it is over, only half as many believe that it is. Most, fully 79%, believe there is still a Cold War of some sort but that its intensity is lessening.

Even if the Cold War is winding down, the idea of victory celebrations seems nevertheless inappropriate. The respondents were asked, if the Cold War is over or lessening, who won? A majority of Canadians (54%) say neither side. Slightly fewer (40%) say both sides won to some extent. Only a small minority (5%) believe the West won and fewer still believe the Soviets won.

PERCEPTIONS OF NON-MILITARY THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY

Given this general decline in the stock-in-trade threats of the Cold War period, already evident in previous CIIPS polls, a focus of the 1989 survey was on the question of the alternative threats currently perceived by Canadians. If wars conventionally defined and initiated are now highly unlikely and have, as a result, declined in importance, have other threats to international peace and security taken their place in the public mind?

The past few years have provided many trends which have contributed to the undermining of this Cold War outlook, among them the de-escalation of East-West rhetoric, the drive toward reform in the Soviet Union and its East European Warsaw Pact allies, and recent disarmament agreements such as the INF Treaty of 1987. At the same time, there has been a growing consciousness and growing debate about damage to the environment, particularly such problems as the deteriorating ozone layer, the "greenhouse effect," and the disposal of hazardous waste. There have also been continuing questions about budget deficits, possible recessions, growing trade protectionism, global currency

and stock market instability, and mounting concern over such old but increasingly serious issues as that of the transboundary traffic in drugs.

Presenting a choice of three categories of potential threat -- economic, environmental, and military -- the survey asked which threats are the most, second, and least serious facing Canadians at the present moment. Many more Canadians answer that environmental and economic challenges, and not military ones, are what concern them. Indeed, fully eight in ten (83%) rank military threats as the least serious of the three, and less than one in ten evaluate them as the most serious. Slightly more Canadians give top rank to environmental threats (51%) over economic ones (43%).

Despite a raucous and divisive election dominated by the foreign policy issue of "free trade," an election fought on both sides with arguments about the economic perils in which Canada finds itself, and amid the ongoing debate concerning the benefits and costs of the Free Trade Agreement, it is notable that Canadians do not place economic matters as the top priority.

Environmental threats emerge even more strongly when respondents are asked to weigh these factors as challenges in ten years time. (See Figure 2.) Fully 66% feel that pollution and related issues should be at the top of Canadian policymaking agendas within a decade. This is in contrast to the 28% who point to economic threats and the 7% of respondents ranking military threats as the greatest concern to Canada in 10 years.

Canadians have not always ranked environmental issues so highly. By way of comparison, a 1984 poll carried out by the Goldfarb organization for the Department of External Affairs placed environmental protection a distant third in importance for Canada's foreign policy behind world peace and economic growth.

In another set of questions, these three general areas were broken down into nine more specific sources of threat to Canada's security. Included in this group were the threat of major war, poverty and hunger in developing countries, international crime, the spread of disease, global pollution, world trade conflicts, abuses to human rights, international economic instability, and terrorism. Answers to these more focused questions for the most part match with the general results reported above. (See Figure 3.)

Although respondents did not rank each individual topic of concern in relation to the others, it is possible to rank them overall in terms of the average importance attached to each. The two given the highest priority are the threats from global pollution and international crime. For both more than 80% rate them as important to some degree. Pollution and crime are considered extremely important subjects by 54% and 51%, respectively, with about one-third answering that each of these issues is very important. Only small minorities attribute little importance to them.

Much recent media attention has been given to topics such as global warming, acid rain, oil spills, and Colombian drug cartels. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and economic uncertainties have also been dominant concerns in recent months. These patterns are also reflected in the survey responses. The international spread of diseases is considered to be either extremely (33%) or very (39%) important. Respondents hold similar views on international financial and monetary instability -- 48% say very important and 26% extremely important, while 27% say it is not important or only somewhat important. The possibility of trade conflicts is next with 69% of respondents describing this as an important matter, and the remaining 32% putting little emphasis on it.

Four other sources of threat are led by terrorism with 32% and 34% thinking it is "extremely" and "very" important, respectively. Major wars are afforded relatively low importance, with only 59% categorizing war as important. Fully 40% say it is only somewhat or not important. The only problems on the list which are, overall, rated lower than war are human rights, poverty and hunger. Abuses to human rights pose an extremely or very important threat to Canada's security according to 56% of Canadians, while only 44% think this of dangers from Third World poverty. These two are problems which may need solution, but are not seen as threats to Canada's security.

Much the same picture of Canadians' current concerns emerges from the construction of a special index of importance for these issues. (See Table 3.) The index is calculated on the basis of a theoretically maximum possible score of 100 where 50% of the respondents evaluate a problem as "extremely important" and the other 50% evaluate it as "very important."

Table 3 Importance of International Problems

	Index (max. 100)
Global pollution	98
International crime	95
Spread of disease	86
Financial and monetary instability	85
Terrorism	83
Trade conflicts	82
Major war	80
Human rights abuses	77
Poverty and hunger	69

Note: The index represents a theoretically maximum possible score of 100 where 50% of the respondents evaluate a problem as "extremely important" and the other 50% evaluate it as "very important."

Canadians' concerns about these problems, while high in most cases, tends to be clustered. A bare majority still focus on conventional military threats, and these people also tend to be concerned about terrorism. A solid majority sees economic threats -- economic instability and trade conflicts -- as serious, while a minority does not. Most Canadians regard pollution, crime and disease all as important. This grouping might be characterized as socio-political, transnational problems -- ones affecting all states and neither originating in any one state nor arising from any state action itself -- which endanger the security of individuals and groups rather than the security of the state.

Another grouping which emerges includes poverty, human rights, terrorism and crime. Those concerned about these problems seem to make connections among them; they may, for example, see the international traffic in cocaine and ethnic-based terrorism as arising from a lack of human rights and conditions of poverty. Thus these are international problems, with a certain North-South dimension, relating to economic and political deprivation.

This shift in the agenda of international politics is evident elsewhere in the survey. With regard to the statement, "Economic capabilities are now more important than military capabilities in determining a country's influence in the world today," the

consensus among respondents is clear. The vast majority of Canadians believe that military strength is now a less effective instrument of power in the international system. Indeed, of those surveyed, a bare 16% argue against the primacy of economic might.

There is little doubt from polls or any other indicator that most Canadians are conscious of such familiar "Canadian" pollution problems as acid rain and toxic chemicals in the Great Lakes. It would appear as well that they both recognize and accept the seriousness of a range of global environmental problems. Canadians appear to accept a key theme in the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Report), namely, that "the whole notion of security as traditionally understood -- in terms of political and military threats to national sovereignty -- must be expanded to include the growing impacts of environmental stress." Furthermore, environmental threats are not considered to be the only threats. Equally important are economic, social, and less conventional military threats.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUPERPOWERS

As revealed by previous CIIPS polls, Canadians' views of the Soviet Union and the US are no longer simple Cold War "black-white" stereotypes. Indeed, most see both superpowers either in a basically positive light or in a basically negative one. This tendency toward "white-white" or, more commonly, "black-black" images of the USSR and US is a striking phenomenon of the 1980s, and one evident in the images of not only Canadians but also Germans, Britons and other citizens of the Western nations.

One impression of the Soviet Union is also evident in responses to another question: "Is the Soviet Union more or less content with its power or influence in the world today, or is it trying to increase its area of influence?" The respondents in 1989 favour (57%) rather than dispute (44%) the view that the USSR is continuing to expand its power and sphere of influence. When asked the same question about the desires of the United States, respondents more forcefully support the image of a nation seeking to increase its power. Two-thirds (68%) hold this position.

These two questions were asked in the 1987 CIIPS survey, and a similar pair were included in the 1988 poll. The 1988 text read: "Do you believe that the Soviet Union [or, the United States] is mainly interested in world domination or mainly interested in

protecting its own national security?" Only a minority of 39% (USSR) and 33% (US) answered that world domination was what the superpowers desired most.

The more subtle and ambiguous counterpart to "world domination" -- "trying to increase an area of influence" -- was most favoured in 1987, as in 1989. Two years ago, eight in ten thought that both the US and the USSR were set on expansion of power or influence. While those who feel America is searching for more influence have declined by about 10% since 1987, 20% fewer think the Soviet Union wants to expand. The difference over these years shows that few Canadians are likely to think of the superpowers as overtly seeking world control, and, at the same time, the numbers are diminishing of those who think that larger spheres of influence are being sought. (See Figure 4.)

Perhaps one basis for these views is the prevalent assumption that the two superpowers have roughly equivalent military capabilities. Only 11% of respondents think the United States is stronger than its traditional opponent, while 29% judge Soviet power to be greater. However, the majority (60%) sense a parity of East-West forces.

As well as thinking the superpowers have equal numbers of weapons, so do most think there is a rough qualitative symmetry between the two. The CIIPS respondents were provided a series of statements and asked whether each applied more to the Soviet Union or to the United States or to both or neither. Respondents were given four statements. In all but one case, the largest group, representing slightly over 40%, believed the statements apply equally to both -- i.e., wants to dominate the world (42%), is willing to negotiate most disputes (44%), is trustworthy in negotiations (43%), and uses military force to achieve its goals (43%).

The shift in Canadians' perceptions of the superpowers is strikingly evident here. The same set of questions was included in a 1984 poll conducted in Canada by the United States Information Agency. At that time, only half as many respondents, fewer than one in four, thought that both the US and USSR were equally willing to negotiate or were trustworthy in negotiations. And significantly fewer thought that they were equally committed to seeking world domination or using military force.

Canadian public opinion, however, does not regard the two superpowers as completely equivalent in these actions and motives. Of those remaining, more survey participants think that the USSR uses military force (42%) and seeks domination (26%) than so regard the US (9% and 20% respectively). Moreover, many more find the US willing to negotiate (49%) and trustworthy in negotiations (38%) than so find the USSR (5% and 3% respectively).

In two questions related to the issue of negotiation reliability, slightly more people think that Soviet leaders in particular are genuinely seeking arms reductions (55%), whereas a slight minority believe this of US government heads (44%). Compared with the two past CIIPS surveys in which this very question was asked, the only interesting change is that Canadians' impression of the United States is little different than it was one or two years ago, but that of Soviet leaders is slowly but steadily improving. (See Figure 5.)

At the same time as a military threat from the Soviet Union is seen to be of lesser importance than in the past, Canadians are not yet convinced that the USSR is an ordinary and peaceable power. More than two in three respondents (68%) disagreed or disagreed strongly with the statement that "the Soviet Union is a peace-loving nation, willing to fight only if it thinks it has to defend itself." Despite changes apparent within the Soviet Union and in the degree to which Canadian recognize a threat from the USSR, it is clear that the Canadian public is not yet ready entirely to accept that the USSR is not, or could not become again, what it has been seen to be since the Second World War.

CONFIDENCE IN MAJOR POWERS AND THEIR LEADERS

Consistent also with a changing definition of security has been a growing confidence over the past two years in the ability of both superpowers to deal with world problems. Whereas only about one in four expressed considerable or great confidence in the Soviet Union in 1987, more than one in every two Canadians (52%) now do so. And whereas only about one in three expressed this level of confidence in the United States' ability in 1987, two in three (67%) now do so. (See Figure 6.)

In addition, fully half of those interviewed (54%) in the CIIPS poll, before the recent Canada-USSR summit, indicate their confidence in the Soviet Union has increased lately. Another 40% indicate their confidence has remained the same recently. In the case of the United States, only 14% reveal they have a better view of Canada's neighbour, and slightly more (20%) say their opinion of the US has decreased. The remaining two-thirds say their opinion has not altered.

These patterns of confidence in the superpowers provide further evidence of the current tendency to hold either "white-white" or "black-black" images -- that is, either to be positive about both of the superpowers or negative about both.

If any nation is seen by Canadians in "black" terms, it is the People's Republic of China. A few months after the Bejing government's crackdown on the Democracy Movement protests, over four-fifths of Canadians report having little, very little or no confidence in the PRC. In fact, of the six nations about which the question of confidence was posed to survey respondents, China is the only one in which the majority has a negative view.

On the other hand, a majority say they have great or considerable confidence in Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany to deal with present world problems (55% in each case). Fully 67% have similar confidence in the Canadian government in the international affairs arena.

The 1989 CIIPS questionnaire also asked how trustworthy major world leaders are, in the eyes of respondents. Gorbachev, who has enjoyed something approaching a campaign of often intensely positive media coverage in many Western countries, placed fourth in a field of six leaders. Fully three-quarters of Canadians find him either very or somewhat trustworthy: 13% say he is very trustworthy and 63% somewhat trustworthy. Compared to the largely negative evaluations of Soviet leaders in previous decades, these responses seem remarkable. On the other hand, given the accepted wisdom that Western publics have been captured by "Gorbymania," this overall rating seems, relatively speaking, to be almost reserved. Improved opinions of the Soviet Union once again, apparently, do not necessarily mean that the country or its leadership are suddenly regarded entirely positively.

Among the other leaders, President Bush receives the second highest ratings. The major difference between him and his Soviet counterpart was that fully 21% consider Bush to be very trustworthy -- 8% more than for Gorbachev. Bush is considered at least somewhat trustworthy by 63% of respondents.

While 83% thus say they trust the US president either greatly or somewhat, only slightly fewer (74%) approve of his handling of foreign policy matters during the short time he has been in the White House. Although direct comparison with the ratings Ronald Reagan received from Canadians is not possible (due to differences in question wording), the evaluations of the current incumbent, with his quiet, more pragmatic approach, seem considerably more favourable than those of his predecessor. (For a comparison of perceptions of superpower leaders now with those of the past two years, see Figure 7.)

Perhaps surprisingly, Canadians rate Margaret Thatcher as the most trustworthy leader. (It should be noted that the 1989 poll was taken during September and October, largely before the brouhaha between Thatcher and the other leaders, especially Prime Minister Mulroney, at the Commonwealth Heads of government meeting in Malaysia and before the recent resignation of Thatcher's Chancellor of the Exchequer, an event that appears to have taken some of the gloss off the British leaders's image in the UK.) Fully 36% of Canadians find her a very trustworthy while 51% think she is somewhat trustworthy. The "Iron Lady" may or may not be liked by the majority of Canadians, but she is certainly respected.

West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the new Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu received votes of approval for being somewhat trustworthy from slightly more people than Thatcher (65% and 63% respectively), but fewer very trustworthy ratings. Thus the total positive responses are lower for these two (79% and 70%, respectively).

Although a majority of respondents rate Prime Minister Mulroney as either very or somewhat trustworthy, in comparison to his colleagues in other countries he place dead last in these rankings. Only 55% of those surveyed regard him very or somewhat trustworthy, well behind Thatcher (87%), Bush (84%), Kohl (79%), Kaifu (70%), and even Gorbachev (76%). Among other observations that might be made here, it would seem that Canadians are guilty, as sometimes accused, of being particularly critical of their own.

POLICY PREFERENCES FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

(i) Arms Control and Disarmament

Especially since the December 1987 Washington Summit and the signing of the superpower INF Treaty there has been renewed hope of further arms control and disarmament settlements. While clearly sharing these hopes, Canadian opinion is neither deeply pessimistic nor naive in this regard.

Most (86%) of the respondents agree with the statement that "We can never abolish nuclear weapons because the knowledge to make them will always exist." In the minds of Canadians there seems to be no unrealistic expectation for a completely nuclear-free world, even though (as shown on the 1988 CIIPS survey) it is seen as a desirable goal.

The most pressing and difficult arms control and disarmament issue facing the Western Alliance generally since the December 1987 INF Treaty has been the question of what to do about short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The CIIPS respondents were told that "...some people say short-range nuclear weapons (those with a range of less than 500 km) should be eliminated also. Others say NATO's short-range nuclear weapons are essential for preventing a Soviet attack because the Western countries are weaker in conventional (non-nuclear) forces." They were then asked which of three options they favour. One quarter (24%) say at least some missiles should be kept and modernized. Half, on the other hand, want the immediate elimination of all SNF belonging to both the East and West blocs, while another 25% favour a negotiated reduction of these weapons after the Soviets reduce their conventional forces.

Very likely underlying the opinion of those who favour elimination of short-range nuclear forces in Europe is the trust that disarmament will not lead to insecurity. Most (55%) of the CIIPS respondents do not feel that the dismantling of some or maybe even all nuclear weapons could weaken security and "increase the threat of war by making it more likely." The rest (45%), not a negligible group, agree to some degree that it might.

Neither do most Canadians fear the undermining of deterrence in the wake of further disarmament. Most disagree with a second statement: "Simply reducing the level of American and Soviet nuclear weapons by 50% or so could be dangerous as it might leave the West at a disadvantage or make appropriate retaliation to nuclear attack impossible." Half disagreed with this assertion and 13% strongly disagreed. The integrity of Western nuclear deterrent forces can be maintained, it is felt, even with a much diminished stockpile of weapons. That does not rule out, however, (to return to the previous question) an increased threat of conventional war.

(ii) Defence and Deterrence

Consistent with the view that the East-West conflict is declining and the idea that military capabilities are of lesser importance, the vast majority of Canadians (76%) also believe that the West should not strive for military superiority. Furthermore, they are very much in agreement about the desirable balance of military strength. An overwhelming majority (83%) of respondents feel that neither superpower ought to have an advantage over the other. Only a small minority (15%) would prefer an American position of superiority.

In 1989, opinions toward nuclear deterrence are somewhat more ambivalent. On the one hand, most Canadians seem to think that the threat to retaliate in the case of a nuclear attack is credible. Well over nine in ten are confident that the United States would employ their strategic forces if attacked with nuclear weapons. No other question on the survey elicited such an overwhelming response.

And what if there were an attack on the Western European allies? The US has historically been reluctant to become involved in European conflicts, and despite the postwar record, questions still arise about America's commitment to European defence if the US itself is not threatened. Nevertheless, most Canadians are sure that the US would use its own nuclear weapons to retaliate against nuclear aggression on the other side of the Atlantic. Although 30% less than the positive response to the previous question, over two-thirds (68%) hold this opinion.

The survey also asked: "Which do you think is more likely in the future -- that nuclear deterrence will fail and we will have a nuclear war sometime in the future or that nuclear deterrence will work and we will never have a nuclear war?" Fully 71% agree that it will work. The rest presumably expect a war sooner or later.

On the other hand, there is less consensus that deterrence has been as effective a means of keeping the peace as many of its proponents suggest. Only slightly more than half of those answering the survey (56%) agree that nuclear arsenals have so far been the reason there has not been a major world war since 1945. Fully 44% are skeptical of this notion.

Partially because of the continued burden involved, the degree of uncertainty about ultimate American involvement in a limited European war, and the recovery in recent decades of the European economies, some observers in the United States and elsewhere have called for the European NATO countries to rely less on North American support for their defence needs and contribute more themselves. At least three of every four CIIPS respondents (78%) share this opinion. To the extent that these results can be compared with those from a slightly different question used on the 1987 CIIPS survey, it would appear that this view is slightly more prevalent in Canada now than it was two years ago.

POLICY PREFERENCES FOR CANADA

The evident shift in Canadians' perception of threats to security, coupled with some lingering skepticism of the long-term viability of the peace, lead to a mix of policy positions for Canada on such matters as defence spending, and maintaining Canadian forces in Europe, new military capabilities, new defence concepts, and relations with the United States on foreign policy issues.

The Mulroney government's plan, announced last spring, to reduce future federal spending levels on both foreign aid and defence met with little public opposition at the time, and the CIIPS poll suggests only a minority across the country are opposed to the cuts. Defence, moreover, fares no better than foreign aid.

The CIIPS survey noted Ottawa's plan and then asked respondents whether the government should have reduced foreign aid expenditures rather than defence, reduced defence rather than aid, reduced both more, reduced both less, or made other cuts instead. A total of about one-quarter favoured either lower reductions in both (10%) or other budget-cutting measures instead (16%). About the same proportion favour reducing defence only (21%) and the same again favour reducing aid rather than defence (24%). Since roughly another one-quarter prefer reducing both defence and aid more than they had been cut (29%), there is a majority agreeable to at least the announced cuts (if not greater cuts) in both the defence and aid budgets.

Asked specifically about the now-abandoned plan to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines for the Canadian navy, slightly more say they were against the proposal than say they were for it (52% versus 48%). There as much support (50%) -- and a similar degree of opposition (50%) -- to a revised plan to acquire a fleet of conventionally-powered submarines.

If these results seem to suggest an enthusiasm for downscaling Canadian defence capabilities, that conclusion is not borne out by the results of a set of questions dealing with NATO and Canadian forces in Europe. Nor does support for a more independent European defence effort (see above) translate automatically into support for a withdrawal of Canadian troops stationed in Europe. Canadian opinion tends away from isolationism. Only a small minority (14%) do not regard Canada's participation in NATO as important. The rest think participation in NATO is either somewhat or very important. Support for NATO remains. (Fully 89% claim to have heard of the alliance organization.)

More significantly, support for maintaining Canadian forces in Europe is high, and there has been no decline in this support since 1987 when this question was last asked on the CIIPS poll. About one in every four (24%) argue that Canadian forces should be reduced or withdrawn, while the remaining three in four support their being kept at present levels or being increased (these individual totals were, respectively, 59% and 17%).

When asked whether the size of Canada's contingent ought to be downscaled in the event of an East-West agreement to reduce significantly the conventional military forces in Europe, fully 41% say that the Canadian force levels ought still to be maintained.

(The wording noted but did not emphasize the point, argued by military experts, that substantial reductions in the numbers of Canadian soldiers might leave these units ineffective militarily.) About one-third (35%) favour reducing Canadian troops by the same proportion as the overall reductions, while one-quarter (24%) opted for complete withdrawal.

Canadians seem to be defence policy traditionalists in another sense. They are still willing to defend Europe if it were ever invaded. Almost six in ten (58%) say that the use of Canadian troops would be justified in the event of an invasion of Western Europe. The rest, over four in ten, say their use would not be justified. This level of reluctance is rather higher than that of Americans, according to a May 1989 CBS-New York Times poll.

Canadians are, at the same time, skeptical, at least, about some of the newer ideas regarding European security such as "nonprovocative" defence or "defensive-defence." This idea, now very much debated in Europe, was described to respondents as getting "rid of weapons that could be used to attack the other side" and relying "only on non-threatening weapons." Less than one in three (33%) thought the idea "makes sense"; the rest (67%) thought it impossible to have weapons for defensive purposes only.

When presented with a stark choice of going to war or being overcome -- "Suppose you had to make a decision between fighting an all-out nuclear war or living under communist rule. How would you decide?" -- Canadians seem to indicate that the Cold War resolve to resist communism, whether in Europe or at home, is diminishing. More tend to favour the latter; 61% say they would rather live under communist rule, with the other 39% are willing to fight. To the extent that direct comparison can be made between questions of slightly different wording, Canadian willingness to fight seems to have declined in recent decades. By way of direct comparison with the May 1989 CBS-New York Times survey, significantly more Americans, when faced with the same choice, opt for fighting an all-out nuclear war than choose the alternative, the opposite of the pattern in Canada.

CANADA AND THE SUPERPOWERS

The final set of questions on the 1989 poll deals with Canada's relations with the two superpowers. Previous surveys have shown that Canadian public attitudes are consistently negative toward nuclear weapons and consistently positive toward arms control policies. For example, there is strong support for a comprehensive test ban treaty to control or eliminate all testing of nuclear weapons. That support remains high, even when the question is turned into a question about Canada's relationship with the United States. Asked if Canada "should push actively for such a ban even if the United States strongly opposes it and argues it might weaken nuclear deterrence," about six in ten (59%) say the government should indeed actively promote a ban. Roughly three in ten (29%) would prefer quiet diplomacy -- efforts, quietly conducted, to gain American agreement to such a ban. Only a few (12%) think Canada should not get involved in this issue.

On another matter dealing with relations with the United States, the majority advise a more cautious approach. The question was posed: "Suppose the President of the United States announces that he has sent troops to defend a country from an invasion because he believes it was in the national interest of the United States to do so. What should Canadians do?" The vast majority (88%) recommend that Canadians should debate the pros and cons of this decision so that we can make our own judgement on the rightness of the decision. Only one in every ten Canadians believes the action should be supported.

A Canada-United States cleavage here is notable. A nearly identical question asked on a late-1988 US survey showed that the American public is almost evenly split between those supporting their president and those who favour debating the pros and cons of his decision. Whether through simple patriotism or some other factor, Americans are four times as likely as Canadians to believe they should "rally 'round the flag."

Perhaps consistent with the even-handed views of the two superpowers noted earlier, the vast majority of Canadians, over eight in ten (83%) in fact, agree Canada should have close ties with both superpowers while staying out of their disputes. The remainder disagree with this view to a greater or lesser extent.

The respondents were also asked about Canada-Soviet relations and about the prospects for the then upcoming summit meeting between Prime Minister Mulroney and President Gorbachev. With respect to the recent visit to the USSR, the vast majority of Canadians -- 90% in all -- say closer cooperation between the two countries would be a good thing. Opinion is divided, however, on what issues the two countries should most cooperate. The most frequently chosen answers are: improving East-West relations, fostering exchanges between the two nations, and increasing bilateral trade. (The response totals are 34%, 28%, and 27%, respectively.) Only a handful think that Canada and the USSR should spend time working together on arms control or Arctic research as a top priority.

Great expectations about the summit were not common among Canadians; those of many, indeed, were decidedly modest. Very few (6%) thought that the Prime Minister's trip would make a "very significant" contribution to international peace. About 40% were of the opinion that it was not at all important in this regard. A bare majority (55%) thought it would make a "somewhat significant" contribution.

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

While the foregoing discussion of aggregate results reveals much about Canadians' attitudes on peace and security issues, it does not address the question of whether Canadians differ in their attitudes according to personal, or demographic, characteristics.

To do so requires analyzing each of the range of attitudes by demographic breakdowns. The same four groupings are looked at here as in the last two years -- language, region, age, and gender. Attitudes cross-tabulated by an additional variable -- household income -- are also detailed. Given that the purpose of this analysis is not to compare results from previous years with those from 1989, suffice it to say that there has been little change since 1987 in the general nature of these demographic patterns.

Only statistically significant results are summarized below and included in the tables in Appendix B -- that is, where there were significant differences in attitudes across demographic groups. In the text that follows, these results are generally, but not always, grouped similarly to the foregoing discussion of results. Thus we will deal with

perceptions of military threats, perceptions of non-military threats, perceptions of the superpowers, perceptions of major powers and their leaders, policy preferences for the Western alliance, and policy preferences for Canada. (The tables in Appendix B are ordered by the question number in the questionnaire for easier reference.)

As in the past two surveys, the 1989 CIIPS questionnaire included a question about awareness of international events. Although not strictly a demographic question, it is nonetheless interesting to see how respondents rate themselves: 19% say they follow news of international events very closely, 49% somewhat closely, 29% not too closely, and 4% not closely at all. Even though the wording of the question changed slightly since the last survey -- earlier respondents were asked how well informed they were as opposed to how closely they follow international news -- responses have hardly altered.

(i) Language

Despite a significant transformation in Canadian attitudes toward international issues, one long-standing element of Canadian public opinion remains -- a noticeable difference between Francophones and Anglophones. (See Tables A1 to A8 in Appendix B.)

This difference is apparent on judgements of the chance of war in the next ten years and the greatest military threat to peace. French Canadians tend to be more pessimistic about the likelihood of a war, while, at the same time, fingering the arms race as the likely culprit in undermining peace. While being more optimistic about the chances of a decade free of nuclear conflict, English-speaking Canadians are more likely to fear problems associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A cleavage is also reflected in English and French views about the circumstances under which nuclear weapons would probably be used. Anglophones are somewhat more likely to point to regional disputes as the reason for nuclear conflict, whereas the French much more often select traditional scenarios: Soviet attack on the US, Soviet invasion of Western Europe, and superpower conflict in other regions escalating to nuclear war. Given these differences of opinion, it may not be surprising that French Canadians in the 1989 survey have slightly less faith in the US and USSR. They have a greater fear of the Soviet military threat to North America, are somewhat less likely to

think this threat has declined in recent years, and expect less change toward superpower cooperation.

The contrast is also evident in the two language groups' views on the two superpowers and other leading nations. Francophones tend to be less confident in either superpower. Anglophones have generally more favourable attitudes toward both superpowers, although not on every issue.

English Canadians tend more to think that the US is stronger in military terms, and that the USSR is striving toward world domination and is willing to use military force to gets its way. Furthermore, Anglophones are more likely to think that the US and the USSR are content with their influence as it stands today, to perceive that Soviet leaders want disarmament, and to be confident, indeed, more confident than earlier, about superpower dealings on foreign policy issues. On these concerns, French Canadians tend more to see a balance in US and Soviet military capabilities, while either saying that both superpowers strive for domination and are willing to use military force, or to say that the USSR is least likely to want world domination and that the Soviets are less willing to use military influence. French Canadians are also less likely to feel that USSR leaders want disarmament and that either superpower is content with its influence in the world as it stands today. These attitudes are combined with a lesser degree of confidence in the US and USSR, and less change in opinions about the USSR recently. About other major powers (and about Bush and Thatcher) English-speakers are also more positive than French ones, except on views of Canada where the two groups display few significant differences.

Because they tend toward greater negativism about both superpowers than do English Canadians, it might be reasonable to assume that French Canadians would rank military threats relatively highly. This is not the case. Perhaps because of recent controversies in Quebec about PCB disposal and other pollution issues, Francophones are much more likely to point to environmental concerns as the most serious problem for Canadian policymakers today. (There is little difference between French and English opinion on the question of the most important threat to Canadians in a decade's time.) On the other hand, English Canadians are more concerned about trade matters, but only marginally so.

A linguistic cleavage in Canadian opinion is not so prominent on prescriptions of policy for the Western alliance. The most pronounced contrast concerns whether or not nuclear weapons are essential in the prevention of war. English-speaking Canadians are much more likely to say these weapons are needed for deterrence. But sharp differences end here. On issues of the importance of economic versus military power, the need for the West to strive for military superiority, and the advisability of a more independent European defence, French Canadians tend slightly more often to hold strongly held opinions -- either strongly agreeing or strongly disagreeing -- but, overall, those who agree and disagree are approximately the same whether or not the respondent is of French or English linguistic background.

There are, however, more interesting differences between Francophones and Anglophones on Canadian policy questions. English-speakers in greater numbers want to reduce the foreign aid budget, know of NATO and strongly favour Canadian participation in it, and think Canada's forces in Europe should be increased. More French-speakers prefer to reduce the defence budget, not acquire nuclear submarines, withdraw or reduce Canadian forces in Europe, and live under communist rule than fight a war. They also tend more to think that Prime Minister Mulroney's visit to Moscow will lead to positive effects on peace.

(ii) Region

For the most part, and for obvious reasons, the opinions of Francophones closely correspond to those of Quebeckers. There are, however, interesting regional differences in attitudes and perceptions among Canadians beyond those between Quebec and the rest of the country. For convenience, the country was divided up into four regions when looking at these variations in opinion: the Atlantic provinces, Quebec, Ontario, and the West. (See Tables B1 to B7 in Appendix B.)

There are a few issues on which it is worth briefly noting attitudes in particular regions as being different from the rest. For example, the largest number of people who rank economic threats as of greatest importance now facing Canadians are from British Columbia, but, when the threat of economic instability is considered by itself, this contrast between the West Coast and the rest of Canada is not so apparent. Ontarians

are least worried about the threat of a major war, but feel Canadian military involvement in Western Europe would be justified if Western Europe were to be invaded.

With respect to the Maritimes, there are a number of differences worth noting. Maritimers are more likely to fear threats from terrorism, think the US is ahead of the USSR in total military strength, have more trust in Prime Minister Mulroney, and support Canada's participation in NATO and the increase of Canadian forces in Europe. Respondents from the Atlantic coast also tend more than others, perhaps understandably, to favour new submarines for Canada's navy.

While these results may be interesting in themselves, there is no consistent pattern of views that distinguishes any one particular region, other than the expected differences between Quebec and the rest of the country. There is, however, a tendency for those respondents from Ontario west to be slightly more positive about trends in world politics, while those from Quebec to the Atlantic hold somewhat more negative views.

This tendency is evident on issues of threat. Easterners, taken in the sense above, more often say that the following are likely: the chance of war, the chance of nuclear weapons use through a Soviet attack on North America and nuclear weapons use in superpower conflict over regional disputes. Those respondents from Ontario to the Pacific are more likely to think there is no threat to North America from the Soviet military, the Soviet threat has in fact declined compared to a few years ago, and increased cooperation among nations should be expected in the future.

This same distinction between tendencies of opinion in Eastern and Western Canada is also found on confidence in the superpowers. Those from Ontario, the Prairies and the West Coast are more likely to label themselves as having confidence in the US, the USSR, and the Federal Republic of Germany. These people are also among the most likely to say their confidence in the USSR has increased recently. Those in Quebec and in the Atlantic region tend to indicate that their confidence in the USSR has remained the same as it was earlier. While more skeptical about transformation in the threat from the USSR, Easterners are at the same time more willing to live under communist rule if the only other option would be to fight a war.

(iii) Gender

Gender seems to be a discriminating characteristic on many questions in the 1989 CIIPS survey, including issues of threat, impressions of world powers, and policy preferences. (See Tables C1 to C6 in Appendix B.)

Concerning threats to peace in general -- not necessarily military threats -- women tend to be more concerned about socio-economic issues like poverty, the spread of disease, and abuses to human rights. Men are more likely to downplay the threat of war and the use of nuclear weapons which involves the superpowers directly. Rather, men more often see regional conflicts as the greatest military threats to peace, whereas women name the arms race as the greatest threat. Consistent with these views is the tendency of females to fear the Soviet use of nuclear weapons in a surprise attack or by accident, and to say that the USSR is a threat to North America. Furthermore, men see a decline in the Soviet threat and increased prospects for international cooperation in greater numbers than do women.

This pattern among male and female attitudes is also reflected in views about major nations. Men are more confident in the FRG and Japan while at the same time being more likely to report that their views of the two superpowers have improved recently. They are also more likely to approve of President Bush's foreign policy.

On policy questions women are slightly more likely to fear that disarmament could leave the West defenceless, but less likely to have favorable opinions about nuclear deterrence. Rather, it is men who tend most often to agree that nuclear weapons are essential to deterrence and think that deterrence will be a successful strategy for the prevention of war. In this sense men tend to adhere to more traditional foreign policy positions. Men are also more willing to fight when it comes to all-out nuclear war in preference to submission to communist rule.

(iv) Age

For the purpose of the present analysis, respondents were first divided into three age groupings: those under 35 years of age, those between the ages of 35 and 54, and

those over 54. Generally speaking, the greatest gulf lies between those people in the younger and the older categories. (See Tables D1 to D6 in Appendix B.)

Before noting these, however, there are number of instances in which this is not so clearly the case. Those between 35 and 54 are more likely than those respondents either older or younger, for example, to think that conventional war in Europe is not impossible, that the US is more willing to negotiate to solve disputes than the Soviet Union, and that President Bush's foreign policy merits approval.

When most issues of threat that have significant variation by age are considered, a pattern is apparent which suggests that the younger a respondent is, the more likely she or he will be to hold "traditional" views of the international system, or, perhaps, to have been more affected by the superpower tensions of the early 1980s. This includes believing more often that the threat from a major war is extremely important for Canada, the chance of nuclear war in 10 years is likely, and the use of nuclear weapons will likely come about through superpower involvement. Furthermore, the older a person is, the more likely he or she will be to feel that the USSR is not a threat to North America, the Soviet threat is less than it was ten years ago, there will be increased international cooperation if current trends continue, and that both international crime and Third World poverty are pressing problems.

Perceptions of the superpowers differ somewhat across age groups. Younger Canadians tend to hold less favourable opinions of Gorbachev, think the US is trying to extend its influence in the world, say that Soviet leaders do not want disarmament, and think we will never be able to abolish nuclear weapons. Those under 55 also have relatively more confidence in Canada to deal with world problems, while those 55 and older are most likely to describe British Prime Minister Thatcher as very trustworthy.

The younger respondents may be more skeptical about the good intentions of the two superpowers, and possibly for this reason are somewhat more interested in seeing disarmament become a reality. The younger generations do not agree as often as do older people that disarmament would lead to a greater danger of war or a weakening of Western deterrence capabilities. Given these tendencies, it may not be surprising that younger Canadians also are relatively less likely to assert that nuclear weapons are essential for deterrence, and more likely to say that deterrence will fail. Older respon-

dents favour both modernization of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe and a more independent European defence. Canadians over 55 are also more willing than others to fight a war rather than live under communist rule.

(v) Income

The fifth set of demographic variations included from the 1989 survey is household income. This variable was first divided up into four categories before analysis: households earning less than $20,000, between $20,000 and $34,999, $35,000 to $59,999, and $60,000 or more. (See Tables E1 to E5 in Appendix B.)

Among the propensities that emerge across income groups is one which shows that those respondents with incomes under $20,000 a year are the most likely to say nuclear war is likely within the next decade. These people also tend to respond that nuclear weapons are most likely to be employed in a Russian surprise attack on North America or an invasion of Western Europe. On the opposite end of the income spectrum, people earning more than $60,000 are most likely to feel that nuclear weapons use by terrorists or madmen is unlikely and that regional disputes are very unlikely to spark a nuclear exchange by the superpowers. The higher earning brackets also are more positive about the prospects for increased international cooperation, while lower income groups tend not to exclude the possibility of a conventional war in Europe and are also the most likely of the four groups to say the Cold War is not over.

Non-military threats to peace, which are most often indicated by the lowest income respondents to be of importance, are those from Third World poverty and hunger, the international spread of diseases, and abuses to human rights.

For the most part, the wealthiest respondents display a more positive attitude toward the two superpowers. These people tend to say that the USSR is content with its influence and power in the world today and that both American and Soviet leaders really do desire disarmament. They also tend to have more confidence in the ability of Japan to deal wisely with present world problems and to say that their confidence in the USSR has recently increased. Poorer people, on the other hand, are most likely to say that their confidence in the USSR has remained the same as before.

On policy questions, lower income earners tend, more than others, toward thinking that disarmament may leave the West defenceless and that a greater European military effort should be encouraged. Furthermore, in regard to Canadian policies, the under $20,000 category of respondents prefers the tactic of quietly encouraging the US to accept a comprehensive test ban, and generally thinks Canada should have closer relations with both superpowers. Comparing the highest earners with the lowest, those with over $60,000 a year are much more likely to agree that Canadian military involvement in Europe would be justified if Western Europe were to be invaded. Also, the higher the income, the more likely one is to claim to know of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

CONCLUSION

Five decades after World War II, and moving into the last decade of the Twentieth Century, Canadians are redefining their perceptions of global threats and security. While it is difficult to compare directly Canadians' present conceptions of security with those of a generation ago, for lack of data, it is inconceivable that these conceptions are not much different than those of, say, the 1960s.

Certainly today's viewpoints are not fixed in any narrow definition of military security; they comprise not only concerns, generally diminishing, about conventional military threats, but also concerns about the frailty of nuclear deterrence, about economic challenges, and about environmental dangers. They feature perceptions of new, as well as some traditional, threats and recognize the need for common, rather than just national, security in an interdependent world.

Non-traditional, even uncommon threats, particularly economic, environmental and social challenges, have apparently not only been recognized by the public but have captured its attention to a degree that would surprise many statesmen and officials, especially those involved in defence policy-making.

The emerging era, one of East-West concord rather than merely détente, has already given rise to broader, more encompassing, conceptions of security.

Canadians, nonetheless, are not yet willing to join in the rising chorus of voices declaring the Cold War officially over. Most agree, however, that it, like the old gray mare, is not what it used to be.

At the same time, despite Gorbachev, and despite over forty years of waiting in vain for the Russians to attack the west, Canadians are not convinced that the USSR is basically a peaceful, status quo power. The Soviets, to use the colloquial, are not entirely out of the Cold War woods yet.

Canadians' "new thinking," however, does not abandon traditional policies; instead it incorporates those existing policies that address threats which, while in decline, have not entirely disappeared and probably will not disappear in the foreseeable future. Canadians may not share the "nostalgia for the Cold War" of which the Bush Administration was recently accused, but neither have they merely adopted a new set of post-Cold-War blinders.

APPENDIX A

CIIPS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE AND RESULTS*

Question: 1

How closely would you say you follow news about world affairs and foreign policy issues?

Responses:

1.	Very closely	18.9
2.	Somewhat closely	49.0
3.	Not too closely	28.5
4.	Not at all	3.6
		100.0%

Question: 2

Which one of the following military developments do you think poses the greatest threat to world peace?

Responses:

1.	Soviets actions on the international scene	5.4
2.	United States actions on the international scene	9.0
3.	The superpowers arms race	20.6
4.	Regional conflicts elsewhere in the world	25.3
5.	The spread of nuclear arms to smaller countries	39.7
		100.0%

Question: 3a)

How much confidence do you have in the ability of the following countries to deal wisely with present world problems?

Responses:

The People's Republic of China

1.	Very Great	1.8
2.	Considerable	15.0
3.	Little	36.9
4.	Very Little	30.6
5.	None	15.7
		100.0%

* Percentages have been calculated after the exclusion of cases in which no reply was given for a particular question.

Japan	
1. Very Great	8.2
2. Considerable	47.4
3. Little	32.4
4. Very Little	8.4
5. None	3.5
	99.9%

The United States	
1. Very Great	12.9
2. Considerable	53.9
3. Little	26.1
4. Very Little	4.2
5. None	2.9
	100.0%

West Germany	
1. Very Great	6.5
2. Considerable	48.4
3. Little	33.1
4. Very Little	8.5
5. None	3.5
	100.0%

Canada	
1. Very Great	18.1
2. Considerable	48.4
3. Little	23.8
4. Very Little	7.2
5. None	2.5
	100.0%

The Soviet Union	
1. Very Great	6.6
2. Considerable	45.6
3. Little	33.7
4. Very Little	10.2
5. None	3.9
	100.0%

Question: 3b)

Has your confidence in the United States' ability to deal with world problems increased lately, decreased, or remained about the same?

Responses:	
1. Increased	14.4
2. Decreseased	20.3
3. Remained the same	65.3
	100.0%

Question: 3c)

And what about the Soviet Union? Has your confidence in the USSR's ability to deal with world problems increased lately, decreased or remained the same?

Responses:

1.	Increased	53.5
2.	Decreased	6.6
3.	Remained the same	39.8
		99.9%

Question: 4

If present trends in world affairs continue, which one of the following do you expect to happen?

Responses:

1.	Increased cooperation among major countries	65.5
2.	Decreased cooperation among major countries	12.0
3.	No change	22.5
		100.0%

Question: 5

Please rank the three threats below from the most serious threat facing Canadians at the present time internationally to the least serious threat facing Canada at the present time internationally.

Responses:

Economic threats

1.	Most	43.3
2.	Second most	46.4
3.	Least	10.3
		100.0%

Environmental threats

1.	Most	50.5
2.	Second most	43.3
3.	Least	6.2
		100.0%

Military threats

1.	Most	6.1
2.	Second most	10.8
3.	Least	83.0
		99.9%

Question: 6

Thinking about ten years from now, please rank the three threats below from the most serious threat facing Canada internationally to the least serious threat facing Canada internationally.

Responses:

Economic threats		
1.	Most	28.3
2.	Second most	58.2
3.	Least	13.5
		100.0%
Environmental threats		
1.	Most	65.5
2.	Second most	25.6
3.	Least	8.9
		100.0%
Military threats		
1.	Most	6.9
2.	Second most	15.9
3.	Least	77.2
		100.0%

Question: 7

Listed below are a number of international problems that may affect Canada's security. [Please rank the importance of each problem.]

Responses:

Major War		
1.	Extremely Important	34.4
2.	Very Important	25.3
3.	Somewhat Important	27.8
4.	Not Important	12.4
		99.9%
Poverty and hunger in developing countries		
1.	Extremely Important	14.2
2.	Very Important	30.4
3.	Somewhat Important	40.1
4.	Not Important	15.3
		100.0%

International crime such as drug trafficking	
1. Extremely Important	50.5
2. Very Important	34.7
3. Somewhat Important	12.5
4. Not Important	2.3
	100.0%
Spread of diseases internationally	
1. Extremely Important	33.1
2. Very Important	39.2
3. Somewhat Important	24.6
4. Not Important	3.1
	100.0%
Global pollution problems	
1. Extremely Important	54.2
2. Very Important	35.7
3. Somewhat Important	9.3
4. Not Important	0.8
	100.0%
World trade conflicts and trade protectionism	
1. Extremely Important	21.6
2. Very Important	46.5
3. Somewhat Important	28.9
4. Not Important	3.0
	100.0%
Abuses of human rights	
1. Extremely Important	19.9
2. Very Important	36.2
3. Somewhat Important	38.0
4. Not Important	5.9
	100.0%
International financial and monetary instability	
1. Extremely Important	25.5
2. Very Important	47.9
3. Somewhat Important	25.0
4. Not Important	1.6
	100.0%
Terrorism	
1. Extremely Important	32.3
2. Very Important	33.9
3. Somewhat Important	28.8
4. Not Important	5.0
	100.0%

Question: 8

Now thinking about nuclear war, within the next ten years, how likely do you think it is that there would be a nuclear war?

Responses:

1.	Very likely	4.1
2.	Likely	14.9
3.	Unlikely	55.6
4.	Very unlikely	25.4
		100.0%

Question: 9a)

If a nuclear conflict does occur and North America is attacked with nuclear weapons, do you think the United States will or will not use its own nuclear weapons?

Responses:

1.	Will use	95.4
2.	Will not use	4.6
		100.0%

Question: 9b)

And what if Europe were attacked with nuclear weapons? Do you think the United States will or will not use its own nuclear weapons?

Responses:

1.	Will use	67.5
2.	Will not use	32.5
		100.0%

Question: 10

Do you agree or disagree that nuclear weapons have been essential to preventing or deterring a major world war?

Responses:

1.	Agree	56.2
2.	Disagree	43.8
		100.0%

Question: 11

Which do you think is most likely in the future--that nuclear deterrence will fail and we will have a nuclear war sometime in the future or that nuclear deterrence will work and we will never have a nuclear war?

Responses:

1.	Nuclear deterrence will fail	29.5
2.	Nuclear deterrence will work	70.5
		100.0%

Question: 12

Listed below are some ways that the use of nuclear weapons might come about. For each one, please tell me how likely you think this will be in your lifetime?

Responses:

The Soviets launch a surprise attack on the United States

1.	Very Likely	2.8
2.	Likely	14.5
3.	Unlikely	45.8
4	Very Unlikely	36.9
		100.0%

The Soviets invade Western Europe

1.	Very Likely	2.8
2.	Likely	23.7
3.	Unlikely	52.5
4.	Very Unlikely	21.0
		100.0%

Terrorists or a madman use a nuclear weapon

1.	Very Likely	23.3
2.	Likely	51.5
3.	Unlikely	19.3
4.	Very Unlikely	5.9
		100.0%

A country other than the United States or the Soviet Union uses a nuclear weapon in a regional conflict

1.	Very Likely	19.1
2.	Likely	50.2
3.	Unlikely	25.4
4.	Very Unlikely	5.3
		100.0%

The United States or Soviet Union gets drawn into a regional conflict, and their involvement leads to a nuclear exchange between them

1.	**Very Likely**	6.4
2.	**Likely**	25.7
3.	**Unlikely**	50.8
4.	**Very Unlikely**	17.1
		100.0%

Some equipment fails or someone makes a mistake and nuclear weapons are fired by accident

1.	Very Likely	8.8
2.	Likely	35.8
3.	Unlikely	38.0
4.	Very Unlikely	17.4
		100.0%

Question: 13

Do you believe the military threat from the Soviet Union is constantly growing and presents a real, immediate danger to North America, or not?

Responses:

1.	Yes	17.2
2.	No	82.8
		100.0%

Question: 14

Do you think the threat from the Soviet Union is more, less, or about the same as it was a few years ago?

Responses:

1.	More	9.4
2.	Less	56.6
3.	About the same	34.0
		100.0%

Question: 15

Right now, would you say the United States is...?

Responses:

1.	Superior in military strength to the Soviet Union	11.1
2.	Not as strong as the Soviet Union	29.4
3.	About the same	59.5
		100.0%

Question: 16

What would be best in your opinion?

Responses:

1.	For the United States to be ahead in total military strength	15.4
2.	For the Soviet Union to be ahead in total military strength	2.0
3.	For the two superpowers to be about equal in total military strength	82.6
		100.0%

Question: 17

Do you approve or disapprove of the way President George Bush is handling American foreign policy?

Responses:

1.	Approve	73.5
2.	Disapprove	26.5
		100.0%

Question: 18

Following are some statements that might apply to the United States or might apply to the Soviet Union. For each statement please indicate the extent to which you believe the statement applies to the two countries.

Responses:

Wants to dominate the world

1.	Applies a lot more to the US	9.8
2.	A bit more to the US	10.2
3.	Equally to both countries	41.5
4.	A bit more to the Soviet Union	15.1
5.	A lot more to the Soviet Union	11.3
6.	To neither country	12.1
		100.0%

Is willing to negotiate most disputes

1.	Applies a lot more to the US	13.8
2.	A bit more to the US	34.6
3.	Equally to both countries	44.4
4.	A bit more to the Soviet Union	4.2
5.	A lot more to the Soviet Union	0.6
6.	To neither country	2.4
		100.0%

Is trustworthy in negotiations

1.	Applies a lot more to the US	8.6
2.	A bit more to the US	28.5
3.	Equally to both countries	42.6
4.	A bit more to the Soviet Union	2.9
5.	A lot more to the Soviet Union	0.3
6.	To neither country	17.2
		100.1%

Uses military force to achieve its goals

1.	Applies a lot more to the US	2.9
2.	A bit more to the US	6.3
3.	Equally to both countries	42.8
4.	A bit more to the Soviet Union	28.5
5.	A lot more to the Soviet Union	13.3
6.	To neither country	6.2
		100.0%

Question: 19

Suppose the President of the United States announces that he has sent troops to defend a country from an invasion because he believes it was in the national interest of the United States to do so.

Responses:

1.	Canadians should support the American action	12.1
2.	Canadians should immediately debate the pros and cons of the President's decision so that we can make our own judgement on whether or not he did the right thing	87.9
		100.0%

Question: 20a)

Is the Soviet Union more or less content with its power or influence in the world today, or is it trying to increase its area of influence?

Responses:

1.	More or less content	43.5
2.	Trying to increase its area of influence	56.5
		100.0%

Question: 20b)

Is the United States more or less content with its power or influence in the world today, or is it trying to increase its area of influence?

Responses:

1.	More or less content	32.1
2.	Trying to increase its area of influence	67.9%
		100.0%

Question: 21a)

Some people believe that the Soviet leaders do not genuinely want disarmament. Other people believe that they do genuinely want disarmament. Which or these views is closest to your own?

Responses:

1.	Do not want disarmament	45.1
2.	Do want disarmament	54.9
		100.0%

Question: 21b)

Some people believe that American leaders do not genuinely want disarmament. Other people believe that they do genuinely want disarmament. Which of these views is closest to your own?

Responses:

1.	Do not want disarmament	56.4
2.	Do want disarmament	43.6
		100.0%

Question: 22

How trustworthy do you find the following leaders?

Responses:

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

1.	Very Trustworthy	36.2
2.	Somewhat Trustworthy	50.8
3.	Not Very Trustworthy	9.5
4.	Not at All Trustworthy	3.4
		99.9%

Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu

1.	Very Trustworthy	6.8
2.	Somewhat Trustworthy	62.5
3.	Not Very Trustworthy	26.8
4.	Not at All Trustworthy	3.9
		100.0%

West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

1.	Very Trustworthy	13.6
2.	Somewhat Trustworthy	64.8
3.	Not Very Trustworthy	17.9
4.	Not at All Trustworthy	3.7
		100.0%

American President George Bush

1.	Very Trustworthy	20.5
2.	Somewhat Trustworthy	62.6
3.	Not Very Trustworthy	12.7
4.	Not at All Trustworthy	4.2
		100.0%

Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney

1.	Very Trustworthy	9.0
2.	Somewhat Trustworthy	45.7
3.	Not Very Trustworthy	30.6
4.	Not at All Trustworthy	14.8
		100.1%

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev

1.	Very Trustworthy	13.0
2.	Somewhat Trustworthy	63.3
3.	Not Very Trustworthy	19.4
4.	Not at All Trustworthy	4.3
		100.0%

Question: 23

At the present, there is an international treaty prohibiting tests of nuclear weapons above ground. Some people have suggested that there should be a ban on all such testing, including underground tests. Which one of the following comes closest to your view of what Canada should do about this issue?

Responses:

1.	Canada should push actively for such a ban even if the United States strongly opposes it and argues it might weaken nuclear deterrence	59.3
2.	Canada should quietly try to get American agreement to a ban	28.7
3.	Canada should not get involved in this issue	11.9
		99.9%

Question: 24

One new idea is to get rid of weapons that threaten the other side and rely only on non-threatening weapons. This is called either a "nonprovocative defense strategy" or "common security".

Does the idea of nonprovocative defense or common security, that is, getting rid of weapons that threaten the other side and relying only on non-threatening defensive weapons, make sense to you, or do you think it is impossible to have weapons for defensive purposes only?

Responses:

1.	Relying on non-threatening defensive weapons makes sense	33.0
2.	It's impossible to have weapons for defensive purposes only	67.0
		100.0%

Question: 25a)

Have you heard of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, called NATO?

Responses:

1.	Yes	89.5
2.	No	10.5
		100.0%

Question: 25b)

In your opinion, how important is Canada's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?

Responses:

1.	Very important	52.4
2.	Somewhat important	33.7
3.	Not very important	13.9
		100.0%

Question: 25c)

Canada currently maintains some military forces in Europe as part of NATO. Do you think that ...?

Responses:

1.	The size of these forces should be increased	16.9
2.	The size is just about right	58.6
3.	The size should be reduced	10.4
4.	All Canadian military forces in Europe should be withdrawn	14.1
		100.0%

Question: 26

If Western Europe were to be invaded, would that justify Canadian military involvement, including the use of Canadian troops, or not?

Responses:

1.	Would justify Canadian military involvement	58.2
2.	Would not justify Canadian military involvement	41.8
		100.0%

Question: 27

The current negotiations on conventional forces in Europe involving NATO countries and the Soviet bloc may soon agree to significant reductions in non-nuclear forces (i.e., soldiers, tanks, etc.).

If this reduction occurs, Canada has a number of options about what to do with its existing conventional forces in Europe. Which one of the following best expresses your opinion about what Canada should do?

Responses:

1.	Leave Canadian forces in Europe at their present levels because a smaller unit could not be militarily effective if ever needed	40.8
2.	Reduce existing Canadian forces in Europe by about as much as the overall force reduction (for example - 10% to 20%)	35.4
3.	Given general alliance reductions, bring back to Canada all of its existing NATO forces in Europe	23.9
		100.1%

Question: 28

Suppose you had to make the decision between fighting an all-out nuclear war or living under communist rule. How would you decide?

Responses:

1.	Fight an all-out nuclear war	39.1
2.	Live under communist rule	60.9
		100.0%

Question: 29

For each description or statement below, please mark the box which represents the extent to which you disagree or agree with each description or statement.

Responses:

Disarmament could lead to less security because it might increase the threat of war by making it more likely

1.	Strongly Disagree	12.0
2.	Disagree	43.4
3.	Agree	36.7
4.	Strongly Agree	7.9
		100.0%

It now seems almost impossible that a conventional war would ever break out in Europe

1.	Strongly Disagree	8.9
2.	Disagree	50.8
3.	Agree	35.5
4.	Strongly Agree	4.8
		100.0%

We can never abolish nuclear weapons because the knowledge to make them will always exist

1.	Strongly Disagree	3.8
2.	Disagree	10.5
3.	Agree	53.9
4.	Strongly Agree	31.8
		100.0%

Canada should have close relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States but stay out of their disputes

1.	Strongly Disagree	3.7
2.	Disagree	13.3
3.	Agree	50.5
4.	Strongly Agree	32.6
		100.1%

It's time for Canada and the United States to press Western Europe to take more responsibility for its own defence

1.	Strongly Disagree	3.2
2.	Disagree	19.0
3.	Agree	63.5
4.	Strongly Agree	14.3
		100.0%

Simply reducing the level of American and Soviet nuclear weapons by 50% or so could be dangerous as it might leave the West at a disadvantage or make appropriate retaliation to a nuclear attack impossible

1.	Strongly Disagree	13.3
2.	Disagree	49.7
3.	Agree	31.9
4.	Strongly Agree	5.2
		100.0%

Economic capabilities are now more important than military capabilities in determining a country's influence in the world today

1.	Strongly Disagree	2.0
2.	Disagree	14.3
3.	Agree	60.2
4.	Strongly Agree	23.5
		100.0%

Western countries should do everything in their power to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union

1.	Strongly Disagree	18.5
2.	Disagree	57.8
3.	Agree	19.3
4.	Strongly Agree	4.3
		99.9%

The Soviet Union is a peace-loving nation, willing to fight only if it thinks it has to defend itself

1.	Strongly Disagree	16.0
2.	Disagree	52.4
3.	Agree	27.8
4.	Strongly Agree	3.9
		100.1%

Question: 30

Now that the United States and Soviet Union have agreed to eliminate all "intermediate-range" nuclear weapons in Europe, some people say short-range nuclear weapons (those with a range of less than 500 km) should be eliminated also. Others say NATO's short-range nuclear weapons are essential for preventing a Soviet attack because the Western countries are weaker in conventional (non-nuclear) forces.

Which one of the following do you think would be best?

Responses:

1.	Maintain at lease some short-range nuclear forces for the foreseeable future and modernize them to prevent them from becoming outdated	23.5
2.	Negotiate a reduction of these nuclear weapons only after the Soviets agree to reduce substantially their non-nuclear forces	24.6
3.	Eliminate both sides' short-range nuclear forces as soon as possible	52.0
		100.1%

Question: 31

In 1987, the Canadian government proposed a program to build a small fleet of new submarines for the Canadian forces. These submarines were to have a nuclear propulsion system but not nuclear weapons. Did you favour this proposal or not?

Responses:

1.	Favour proposal	47.8
2.	Not favour proposal	52.2
		100.0%

Question: 32

As you may know, the Canadian government recently announced that the nuclear-powered submarine program would not go ahead. In view of this, how strongly do you favour or oppose Canada buying or building a fleet of conventionally-powered submarines?

Responses:

1.	Strongly favour	14.0
2.	Somewhat favour	36.1
3.	Somewhat oppose	24.4
4.	Strongly oppose	25.5
		100.0%

Question: 33

In the federal government's budget last spring, projected spending on foreign aid and defence was substantially reduced for the next 5 years.

In you view, which one of the following should the federal government have done?

Responses:

1.	Reduce spending on foreign aid rather than defence	23.6
2.	Reduce spending on defence rather than foreign aid	21.2
3.	Reduce spending even more on both	29.0
4.	Both should have been cut less	9.7
5.	Other reductions should have been made instead of either foreign aid or defence	16.4
		99.9%

Question: 34a)

Prime Minister Mulroney is scheduled to make an official visit to the Soviet Union. Do you think it would be a good thing, or not, for Canada and Russia to work more closely together?

Responses:

1.	A good thing	89.8
2.	Not a good thing	10.2
		100.0%

Question: 34b)

In your opinion, how significant a contribution will Prime Minister Mulroney's meeting make toward international peace?

Responses:

1.	A very significant contribution	6.0
2.	A contribution, but not a major one	55.2
3.	Not much contribution	38.8
		100.0%

Question: 35

On which one of the following should Canada and the Soviet Union cooperate most closely?

Responses:

1.	Improving East-West relations	33.8
2.	Increasing trade between the two countries	27.2
3.	Undertaking joint research in the Arctic	3.3
4.	Increasing cultural, scientific and educational exchanges	28.2
5.	Furthering East-West arms control	7.5
		100.0%

Question: 36a)

Do you think summit meetings between Western leaders and Soviet leaders like the one scheduled by Prime Minister Mulroney and recent arms agreements, such as the "INF" Treaty, mean that the Cold War is over?

Responses:

1.	Yes, the Cold War is over	6.1
2.	No, the Cold War is not over	15.1
3.	The Cold War is lessening but not over	78.8
		100.0%

Question: 36b)

If the Cold War is actually over, or if the Cold War is in the process of ending, who do you think won?

Responses:

1.	The Western or capitalist countries won	5.3
2.	The Soviet or communist countries won	1.3
3.	Both sides won, to some extent	39.8
4.	Neither side won	53.6
		100.0%

APPENDIX B

TABLES SHOWING BREAKDOWN BY

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Table A1

	Language	
	English	French
Q2, Greatest military threat		
Soviet actions	6%	3%
US actions	8%	12%
arms race	15%	39%
regional conflicts	26%	22%
nuclear proliferation	45%	24%
Q3A2, Confidence in Japan		
considerable	59%	46%
little	30%	42%
very little	12%	12%
Q3A3, Confidence in the US		
considerable	70%	56%
little	24%	33%
very little	6%	11%
Q3A4, Confidence in the FRG		
considerable	59%	41%
little	30%	44%
very little	11%	15%
Q3A5, Confidence in Canada		
considerable	66%	67%
little	23%	27%
very little	11%	6%
Q3A6, Confidence in the USSR		
considerable	56%	40%
little	33%	37%
very little	11%	23%
Q3C, Confidence in the USSR lately		
increased	57%	42%
decreased	7%	6%
remained the same	36%	51%

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Table A2

	Language	
	English	French
Q4, Do you expect...		
increased cooperation	69%	54%
decreased cooperation	11%	16%
no change	20%	30%
Q5, Most serious threat		
economic	47%	30%
environmental	46%	66%
military	7%	4%
Q7E, Threat from global pollution		
somewhat important	10%	10%
very important	38%	27%
extremely important	52%	62%
Q7F, Threat from world trade conflicts		
somewhat important	28%	46%
very important	49%	40%
extremely important	24%	14%
Q7H, Threat from economic instability		
somewhat important	25%	32%
very important	50%	42%
extremely important	25%	26%
Q7I, Threat from terrorism		
somewhat important	32%	39%
very important	34%	32%
extremely important	34%	28%
Q8, Chance of nuclear war within 10 years		
likely	15%	32%
unlikely	58%	49%
very unlikely	27%	19%

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Table A3

	Language	
	English	French
Q9A, If NAmerica is attacked, US...		
will use nuclear weapons	97%	91%
will not	3%	9%
Q10, Need nuclear weapons for deterrence		
agree	62%	37%
disagree	38%	63%
Q12A, Nuclear weapons use in a Soviet surprise attack		
likely	11%	39%
unlikely	49%	35%
very unlikely	40%	27%
Q12B, Nuclear weapons use in Soviet WEuropean invasion		
likely	20%	48%
unlikely	58%	35%
very unlikely	22%	17%
Q12C, Nuclear weapons use by terrorists		
very likely	22%	27%
likely	52%	49%
unlikely	26%	24%
Q12D, Nuclear weapons use in a regional conflict		
very likely	20%	16%
likely	51%	46%
unlikely	29%	37%
Q12E, Nuclear weapons use by superpowers over regional dispute		
likely	27%	49%
unlikely	55%	36%
very unlikely	18%	14%

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Table A4

	Language	
	English	French
Q13, USSR presents a military threat to North America		
yes	14%	26%
no	86%	74%
Q14, Soviet threat compared with a few years ago		
more	8%	15%
less	60%	46%
about the same	32%	39%
Q15, US compared with Soviet military strength		
US is stronger	12%	7%
US is weaker	30%	27%
parity	58%	66%
Q18A, Strives for world domination		
bit more to US	18%	25%
equally to both	38%	53%
bit more to USSR	30%	14%
neither	13%	8%
Q18B, Willing to negotiate most disputes		
bit more to US	50%	43%
equally to both	43%	48%
bit more to USSR	5%	4%
neither	2%	5%
Q18D, Uses military force to get its way		
bit more to US	9%	11%
equally to both	40%	52%
bit more to USSR	46%	29%
neither	5%	9%
Q20A, Soviet pursuit of influence		
content	49%	27%
trying to expand	51%	73%

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Table A5

	Language	
	English	French
Q20B, American pursuit of influence		
content	35%	23%
trying to expand	65%	77%
Q21A, Soviet leaders want disarmament		
do not	43%	52%
do	57%	48%
Q22A, British Prime Minister Thatcher		
very trustworthy	41%	21%
somewhat trustworthy	49%	56%
not very trustworthy	10%	23%
Q22D, American President Bush		
very trustworthy	23%	14%
somewhat trustworthy	64%	56%
not very trustworthy	13%	30%
Q22E, Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney		
very trustworthy	10%	5%
somewhat trustworthy	42%	57%
not very trustworthy	30%	32%
not at all trustworthy	17%	5%
Q25A, Have you heard of NATO?		
yes	93%	77%
no	7%	23%
Q25B, Canada's participation in NATO		
very important	57%	35%
somewhat	32%	42%
not at all	12%	23%

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Table A6

	Language	
	English	French
Q25C, Canada's forces in Europe should be...		
increased	19%	8%
left as is	57%	65%
reduced	11%	9%
withdrawn	13%	18%
Q26, Canadian military involvement if WEurope is invaded		
would be justified	65%	37%
would not be	35%	63%
Q27, If conventional arms cuts in Europe, Canada should...		
maintain Canadian forces	43%	34%
reduce Canadian forces	34%	40%
withdraw all forces	23%	27%
Q28, Prefer all-out nuclear war or communist rule?		
fight all-out war	41%	32%
live under communism	59%	68%
Q29A, Disarmament could increase the danger of war		
strongly disagree	10%	18%
disagree	44%	41%
agree	46%	41%
Q29B, Conventional war in Europe is impossible		
disagree	61%	55%
agree	39%	45%
Q29C, We can never abolish nuclear weapons		
disagree	14%	16%
agree	57%	44%
strongly agree	29%	41%

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Table A7

	Language	
	English	French
Q29D, Close Canadian relations with both superpowers		
disagree	19%	11%
agree	52%	45%
strongly agree	29%	44%
Q29E, More independent European defence		
disagree	22%	24%
agree	66%	57%
strongly agree	13%	19%
Q29G, Economic power is now most important		
disagree	15%	19%
agree	63%	53%
strongly agree	22%	29%
Q29H, The West should strive for military superiority		
strongly disagree	17%	23%
disagree	61%	49%
agree	22%	28%
Q32, Conventional subs for Canada		
strongly favour	16%	8%
somewhat favour	36%	35%
somewhat oppose	23%	29%
strongly oppose	25%	27%
Q33, With the defence budget, the government should have...		
reduced foreign aid	27%	14%
reduced defence	18%	32%
reduced both more	28%	33%
reduced both less	11%	5%
made other cuts	17%	16%

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Table A8

	Language	
	English	French
Q34B, Effect on peace of Mulroney's upcoming USSR visit		
very significant	4%	12%
somewhat	55%	57%
not at all	41%	31%
Q35, Canada and the USSR should cooperate most toward...		
improving E-W relations	33%	35%
increasing trade	28%	26%
Arctic research	3%	3%
exchanges	26%	34%
E-W arms control	9%	2%
Q36B, Who has won the Cold War?		
West	6%	4%
Soviets	2%	–
both	36%	53%
neither	57%	43%

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Table B1

	Region			
	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	West
Q2, Greatest military threat				
Soviet actions	4%	3%	7%	6%
US actions	10%	12%	9%	5%
arms race	14%	37%	14%	16%
regional conflicts	26%	20%	26%	29%
nuclear proliferation	46%	28%	44%	43%
Q3A3, Confidence in the US				
considerable	67%	58%	70%	71%
little	27%	32%	25%	22%
very little	6%	10%	6%	6%
Q3A4, Confidence in the FRG				
considerable	55%	44%	57%	62%
little	30%	40%	32%	29%
very little	15%	16%	12%	8%
Q3A6, Confidence in the USSR				
considerable	43%	42%	59%	56%
little	38%	37%	31%	34%
very little	19%	22%	11%	10%
Q3C, Confidence in the USSR lately				
increased	50%	46%	56%	59%
decreased	6%	6%	9%	5%
remained the same	44%	48%	35%	37%
Q4, Do you expect...				
increased cooperation	67%	57%	69%	69%
decreased cooperation	14%	14%	11%	11%
no change	19%	29%	20%	20%
Q5, Most serious threat				
economic	43%	30%	47%	50%
environmental	45%	66%	50%	40%
military	13%	4%	2%	11%

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Table B2

	Region			
	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	West
Q6, Most serious threat in 10 years				
economic	19%	24%	32%	29%
environmental	68%	71%	64%	61%
military	13%	5%	4%	10%
Q7A, Threat from a major war				
not important	13%	10%	17%	9%
somewhat important	29%	22%	30%	31%
very important	22%	27%	24%	26%
extremely important	37%	41%	29%	34%
Q7B, Threat from 3rd World poverty				
not important	15%	20%	16%	11%
somewhat important	31%	33%	43%	45%
very important	33%	30%	28%	33%
extremely important	21%	17%	13%	12%
Q7E, Threat from global pollution				
somewhat important	8%	11%	8%	13%
very important	39%	26%	37%	41%
extremely important	54%	63%	55%	46%
Q7F, Threat from world trade conflicts				
somewhat important	26%	43%	24%	33%
very important	52%	42%	48%	48%
extremely important	22%	15%	28%	20%
Q7H, Threat from economic instability				
somewhat important	19%	34%	24%	25%
very important	58%	42%	47%	51%
extremely important	22%	24%	28%	24%
Q7I, Threat from terrorism				
somewhat important	19%	39%	36%	31%
very important	39%	31%	31%	38%
extremely important	42%	30%	33%	31%

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Table B3

	Region			
	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	West
Q8, Chance of nuclear war within 10 years				
likely	24%	30%	15%	13%
unlikely	57%	49%	56%	60%
very unlikely	20%	21%	29%	27%
Q9A, If NAmerica is attacked, US...				
will use nuclear weapons	96%	91%	98%	96%
will not	4%	9%	2%	4%
Q10, Need nuclear weapons for deterrence				
agree	66%	40%	62%	61%
disagree	34%	60%	38%	39%
Q12A, Nuclear weapons use in a Soviet surprise attack				
likely	26%	33%	8%	12%
unlikely	45%	37%	49%	50%
very unlikely	29%	30%	43%	39%
Q12B, Nuclear weapons use in Soviet WEuropean invasion				
likely	27%	44%	21%	18%
unlikely	61%	37%	56%	59%
very unlikely	13%	19%	23%	23%
Q12E, Nuclear weapons use by superpowers over regional dispute				
likely	46%	45%	25%	26%
unlikely	42%	38%	57%	57%
very unlikely	12%	16%	19%	17%
Q13, Soviet military threatens North America				
yes	29%	24%	13%	13%
no	71%	76%	87%	87%

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Table B4

	Region			
	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	West
Q14, Soviet threat compared with a few years ago				
more	13%	15%	5%	9%
less	49%	51%	59%	61%
about the same	37%	35%	36%	30%
Q15, US compared with Soviet military strength				
US is stronger	22%	8%	13%	8%
US is weaker	29%	28%	28%	33%
parity	50%	64%	59%	59%
Q18A, Strives for world domination				
bit more to US	14%	25%	19%	18%
equally to both	39%	49%	39%	38%
bit more to USSR	37%	16%	28%	31%
neither	9%	10%	14%	13%
Q18D, Uses military force to get its way				
bit more to US	8%	10%	11%	6%
equally to both	30%	51%	42%	40%
bit more to USSR	58%	30%	41%	49%
neither	3%	9%	6%	5%
Q20A, Soviet pursuit of influence				
content	32%	29%	52%	50%
trying to expand	68%	71%	48%	50%
Q20B, American pursuit of influence				
content	24%	23%	39%	34%
trying to expand	76%	77%	61%	66%
Q21B, American leaders want disarmament				
do not	39%	62%	55%	58%
do	61%	38%	45%	42%

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Table B5

	Region			
	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	West
Q22A, British Prime Minister Thatcher				
very trustworthy	45%	24%	44%	36%
somewhat trustworthy	45%	56%	46%	53%
not very trustworthy	10%	20%	10%	11%
Q22D, American President Bush				
very trustworthy	25%	13%	25%	21%
somewhat trustworthy	60%	60%	61%	67%
not very trustworthy	15%	26%	14%	12%
Q22E, Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney				
very trustworthy	16%	4%	9%	11%
somewhat trustworthy	39%	56%	39%	47%
not very trustworthy	27%	32%	31%	30%
not at all trustworthy	18%	7%	21%	12%
Q22F, Soviet leader Gorbachev				
very trustworthy	7%	16%	13%	11%
somewhat trustworthy	64%	59%	60%	71%
not very trustworthy	28%	25%	27%	18%
Q25A, Have you heard of NATO?				
yes	92%	79%	95%	91%
no	8%	21%	5%	9%
Q25B, Canada's participation in NATO				
very important	66%	36%	56%	56%
somewhat	21%	40%	32%	34%
not at all	14%	23%	12%	10%
Q25C, Canada's forces in Europe should be...				
increased	27%	8%	21%	16%
left as is	52%	61%	57%	60%
reduced	6%	12%	10%	11%
withdrawn	15%	19%	12%	13%

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Table B6

	Region			
	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	West
Q26, Canadian military involvement if WEurope is invaded				
would be justified	60%	38%	69%	64%
would not be	40%	62%	31%	36%
Q27, If conventional arms cuts in Europe, Canada should...				
maintain Canadian forces	47%	33%	48%	37%
reduce Canadian forces	31%	39%	31%	38%
withdraw all forces	22%	28%	20%	25%
Q28, Prefer all-out nuclear war or communist rule?				
fight all-out war	33%	34%	46%	38%
live under communism	67%	66%	54%	62%
Q29B, Conventional war in Europe is impossible				
disagree	65%	57%	60%	60%
agree	35%	43%	40%	40%
Q29D, Close Canadian relations with both superpowers				
disagree	18%	13%	20%	17%
agree	53%	44%	48%	59%
strongly agree	29%	44%	32%	25%
Q29E, More independent European defence				
disagree	25%	25%	23%	18%
agree	67%	55%	63%	71%
strongly agree	7%	20%	14%	11%
Q29H, The West should strive for military superiority				
strongly disagree	13%	24%	16%	19%
disagree	58%	50%	62%	60%
agree	29%	26%	23%	21%

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Table B7

	Region			
	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	West
Q31, Favoured nuclear-powered subs for Canada in 1987?				
favoured	68%	46%	47%	44%
opposed	32%	54%	53%	56%
Q32, Conventional subs for Canada				
strongly favour	23%	7%	18%	13%
somewhat favour	45%	37%	33%	36%
somewhat oppose	15%	27%	23%	26%
strongly oppose	17%	29%	25%	25%
Q33, With the defence budget, the government should have...				
reduced foreign aid	23%	14%	26%	29%
reduced defence	14%	32%	15%	21%
reduced both more	29%	33%	28%	27%
reduced both less	10%	5%	13%	9%
made other cuts	24%	16%	18%	13%
Q34B, Effect on peace of Mulroney's upcoming USSR visit				
very significant	5%	11%	4%	4%
somewhat	50%	60%	50%	58%
not at all	45%	30%	45%	38%
Q35, Canada and the USSR should cooperate most toward...				
improving E-W relations	29%	32%	38%	32%
increasing trade	22%	27%	28%	28%
Arctic research	3%	3%	5%	2%
exchanges	30%	35%	20%	31%
E-W arms control	15%	3%	10%	7%
Q36B, Who has won the Cold War?				
West	6%	3%	7%	5%
Soviets	–	0%	1%	2%
both	39%	52%	34%	35%
neither	55%	44%	57%	57%

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Table C1

	Gender	
	male	female
Q2, Greatest military threat		
Soviet actions	4%	6%
US actions	8%	10%
arms race	15%	26%
regional conflicts	32%	19%
nuclear proliferation	41%	39%
Q3A2, Confidence in Japan		
considerable	61%	51%
little	30%	35%
very little	9%	14%
Q3A4, Confidence in the FRG		
considerable	62%	48%
little	28%	38%
very little	9%	15%
Q3B, Confidence in the US lately		
increased	18%	11%
decreased	17%	23%
remained the same	65%	66%
Q3C, Confidence in the USSR lately		
increased	60%	48%
decreased	5%	8%
remained the same	36%	44%
Q4, Do you expect...		
increased cooperation	72%	60%
decreased cooperation	7%	17%
no change	21%	24%
Q7A, Threat from a major war		
not important	16%	9%
somewhat	31%	24%
very	25%	25%
extremely	27%	42%

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Table C2

	Gender	
	male	female
Q7B, Threat from 3rd World poverty		
not important	18%	13%
somewhat important	43%	37%
very important	28%	32%
extremely important	11%	18%
Q7C, Threat from international crime		
somewhat important	19%	11%
very important	34%	35%
extremely important	47%	54%
Q7D, Threat from the spread of diseases		
somewhat important	35%	21%
very important	39%	40%
extremely important	26%	40%
Q7E, Threat from global pollution		
somewhat important	12%	8%
very important	32%	39%
extremely important	55%	53%
Q7F, Threat from world trade conflicts		
somewhat important	33%	31%
very important	45%	48%
extremely important	22%	21%
Q7G, Threat from abuses to human rights		
somewhat important	54%	34%
very important	30%	42%
extremely important	16%	23%
Q7I, Threat from terrorism		
somewhat important	39%	29%
very important	31%	37%
extremely important	30%	34%

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Table C3

	Gender	
	male	female
Q8, Chance of nuclear war within 10 years		
likely	13%	24%
unlikely	55%	56%
very unlikely	32%	19%
Q9B, If Europe is attacked, US...		
will use nuclear weapons	65%	70%
will not use them	35%	30%
Q10, Need nuclear weapons for deterrence		
agree	63%	49%
disagree	37%	51%
Q11, Which is most likely?		
deterrence will fail	25%	34%
deterrence will work	75%	66%
Q12A, Nuclear weapons use in Soviet surprise attack		
likely	13%	21%
unlikely	42%	49%
very unlikely	45%	29%
Q12D, Nuclear weapons use in regional conflict		
very likely	20%	18%
likely	54%	46%
unlikely	25%	36%
Q12E, Nuclear weapons use by superpowers over regional dispute		
likely	25%	39%
unlikely	54%	48%
very unlikely	21%	13%

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Table C4

	Gender	
	male	female
Q12F, Nuclear weapons use by accident		
likely	38%	51%
unlikely	43%	33%
very unlikely	19%	16%
Q13, USSR presents a military threat to North America		
yes	13%	22%
no	87%	78%
Q14, Soviet threat compared with a few years ago		
more	6%	12%
less	63%	50%
about the same	30%	37%
Q15, US compared with Soviet military strength		
US is stronger	13%	10%
US is weaker	33%	26%
parity	54%	65%
Q17, Bush's handling of foreign policy		
approve	77%	70%
disapprove	23%	30%
Q22A, British Prime Minister Thatcher		
very trustworthy	36%	37%
somewhat trustworthy	48%	54%
not very trustworthy	16%	10%
Q22C, West German Chancellor Kohl		
very trustworthy	15%	12%
somewhat trustworthy	68%	62%
not very trustworthy	17%	26%

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Table C5

	Gender	
	male	female
Q25A, Have you heard of NATO?		
yes	93%	86%
no	7%	14%
Q25B, Canada's participation in NATO		
very important	48%	57%
somewhat	36%	31%
not at all	16%	12%
Q28, Prefer all-out nuclear war or communist rule?		
fight all-out war	45%	33%
live under communism	55%	67%
Q29E, More independent European defence		
disagree	25%	20%
agree	59%	68%
strongly agree	16%	12%
Q29F, Disarmament may leave the West without deterrence		
strongly disagree	18%	9%
disagree	49%	50%
agree	33%	41%
Q29H, The West should strive for military superiority		
strongly disagree	22%	15%
disagree	58%	58%
agree	21%	27%
Q30, Concerning short-range missiles, NATO should...		
modernize	21%	26%
negot if USSR reduces	31%	19%
reduce ASAP	48%	55%

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Table C6

	Gender	
	male	female
Q32, Conventional subs for Canada		
strongly favour	15%	13%
somewhat favour	31%	41%
somewhat oppose	25%	24%
strongly oppose	30%	22%
Q34B, Effect on peace of Mulroney's upcoming USSR visit		
very significant	7%	5%
somewhat	50%	60%
not at all	43%	35%
Q36B, Who has won the Cold War?		
West	8%	2%
Soviets	1%	1%
both	37%	43%
neither	54%	54%

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Table D1

	AGE		
	18 to 34	35 to 54	55+
Q2, Greatest military threat			
Soviet actions	6%	5%	4%
US actions	10%	6%	11%
arms race	25%	17%	19%
regional conflicts	19%	29%	30%
nuclear proliferation	40%	43%	35%
Q3A5, Confidence in Canada			
considerable	70%	67%	60%
little	19%	24%	31%
very little	11%	9%	9%
Q4, Do you expect...			
increased cooperation	56%	70%	72%
decreased cooperation	16%	10%	9%
no change	28%	20%	18%
Q7A, Threat from a major war			
not important	10%	16%	12%
somewhat important	27%	26%	32%
very important	25%	25%	27%
extremely important	39%	34%	29%
Q7B, Threat from 3rd World poverty			
not important	23%	15%	4%
somewhat important	39%	44%	36%
very important	26%	28%	40%
extremely important	12%	13%	20%
Q7C, Threat from international crime			
somewhat important	22%	12%	7%
very important	37%	36%	31%
extremely important	41%	52%	63%
Q8, Chance of nuclear war within 10 years			
likely	26%	16%	13%
unlikely	51%	55%	64%
very unlikely	23%	29%	24%

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Table D2

	AGE		
	18 to 34	35 to 54	55+
Q10, Need nuclear weapons for deterrence			
agree	49%	56%	67%
disagree	51%	44%	33%
Q11, Which is most likely?			
deterrence will fail	34%	30%	22%
deterrence will work	66%	70%	78%
Q12A, Nuclear weapons use in a Soviet surprise attack			
likely	24%	14%	11%
unlikely	40%	43%	58%
very unlikely	36%	42%	31%
Q12B, Nuclear weapons use in Soviet WEuropean invasion			
likely	34%	23%	20%
unlikely	49%	51%	59%
very unlikely	17%	26%	21%
Q12D, Nuclear weapons use in a regional conflict			
very likely	23%	20%	12%
likely	45%	55%	52%
unlikely	32%	25%	36%
Q12E, Nuclear weapons use by superpowers over regional dispute			
likely	38%	31%	24%
unlikely	44%	50%	62%
very unlikely	18%	19%	14%
Q12F, Nuclear weapons use by accident			
likely	44%	45%	44%
unlikely	36%	37%	42%
very unlikely	20%	18%	14%

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Table D3

	Age		
	18 to 34	35 to 54	55+
Q13, USSR presents a military threat to North America			
yes	21%	15%	14%
no	79%	85%	86%
Q14, Soviet threat compared with a few years ago			
more	13%	9%	5%
less	51%	57%	65%
about the same	37%	34%	30%
Q16, Best military balance			
US lead	13%	14%	20%
USSR lead	4%	1%	1%
parity	83%	85%	79%
Q17, Bush's handling of foreign policy			
approve	66%	81%	76%
disapprove	34%	19%	24%
Q18B, Willing to negotiate most disputes			
bit more to US	47%	54%	44%
equally to both	48%	38%	48%
bit more to USSR	3%	6%	6%
neither	2%	3%	2%
Q18C, Trustworthy in negotiations			
bit more to US	27%	43%	45%
equally to both	46%	40%	41%
bit more to USSR	4%	2%	3%
neither	23%	15%	12%
Q20B, American pursuit of influence			
content	27%	33%	39%
trying to expand	73%	67%	61%

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Table D4

	Age		
	18 to 34	35 to 54	55+
Q21A, Soviet leaders want disarmament			
do not	51%	44%	37%
do	49%	56%	63%
Q22A, British Prime Minister Thatcher			
very trustworthy	24%	41%	48%
somewhat trustworthy	59%	46%	45%
not very trustworthy	18%	13%	6%
Q22D, American President Bush			
very trustworthy	16%	23%	24%
somewhat trustworthy	63%	61%	63%
not very trustworthy	21%	16%	12%
Q22E, Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney			
very trustworthy	7%	10%	10%
somewhat trustworthy	49%	45%	42%
not very trustworthy	27%	30%	36%
not at all trustworthy	17%	15%	12%
Q22F, Soviet leader Gorbachev			
very trustworthy	12%	16%	12%
somewhat trustworthy	60%	61%	70%
not very trustworthy	28%	23%	18%
Q25A, Have you heard of NATO?			
yes	82%	96%	93%
no	18%	4%	7%
Q26, Canadian military involvement if WEurope is invaded			
would be justified	49%	67%	60%
would not be	51%	33%	40%

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Table D5

	Age		
	18 to 34	35 to 54	55+
Q28, Prefer all-out nuclear war or communist rule?			
fight all-out war	35%	32%	54%
live under communism	65%	68%	46%
Q29A, Disarmament could increase the danger of war			
strongly disagree	14%	13%	8%
disagree	48%	44%	35%
agree	38%	43%	57%
Q29B, Conventional war in Europe is impossible			
disagree	62%	58%	58%
agree	38%	42%	42%
Q29C, We can never abolish nuclear weapons			
disagree	14%	15%	14%
agree	45%	55%	65%
strongly agree	40%	31%	21%
Q29D, Close Canadian relations with both superpowers			
disagree	17%	21%	12%
agree	45%	49%	60%
strongly agree	38%	30%	27%
Q29E, More independent European defence			
disagree	29%	22%	13%
agree	61%	62%	69%
strongly agree	10%	16%	18%
Q29F, Disarmament may leave the West without deterrence			
strongly disagree	16%	13%	9%
disagree	48%	56%	44%
agree	35%	31%	47%

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Table D6

	Age		
	18 to 34	35 to 54	55+
Q29G, Economic power is now most important			
disagree	21%	15%	10%
agree	56%	58%	70%
strongly agree	23%	27%	20%
Q29H, The West should strive for military superiority			
strongly disagree	23%	21%	9%
disagree	57%	59%	58%
agree	20%	20%	34%
Q30, Concerning short-range missiles, NATO should...			
modernize	21%	21%	31%
negot if USSR reduces	23%	25%	26%
reduce ASAP	56%	55%	43%
Q33, With the defence budget, the government should have...			
reduced foreign aid	23%	25%	23%
reduced defence	19%	26%	19%
reduced both more	33%	25%	29%
reduced both less	13%	8%	7%
made other cuts	12%	17%	22%

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Table E1

	Income in thousands of $			
	10 to 20	20 to 35	35 to 60	60+
Q3A2, Confidence in Japan				
considerable	40%	53%	61%	64%
little	40%	31%	32%	28%
very little	20%	16%	7%	8%
Q3A3, Confidence in the US				
considerable	64%	67%	69%	65%
little	25%	28%	24%	29%
very little	11%	5%	7%	6%
Q3B, Confidence in the US lately				
increased	8%	13%	17%	18%
decreased	27%	22%	15%	20%
remained the same	65%	65%	68%	62%
Q3C, Confidence in the USSR lately				
increased	44%	48%	57%	63%
decreased	6%	8%	7%	6%
remained the same	50%	45%	37%	31%
Q4, Do you expect...				
increased cooperation	53%	63%	67%	76%
decreased cooperation	16%	15%	11%	7%
no change	32%	22%	22%	17%
Q6, Most serious threat in 10 years				
economic	31%	27%	28%	27%
environmental	60%	62%	67%	70%
military	9%	11%	5%	3%
Q7B, Threat from 3rd World poverty				
not important	7%	18%	21%	13%
somewhat important	36%	42%	36%	47%
very important	35%	28%	30%	30%
very important	22%	13%	13%	10%

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Table E2

	Income in thousands of $			
	10 to 20	20 to 35	35 to 60	60+
Q7D, Threat from the spread of disease				
somewhat important	14%	30%	30%	34%
very important	43%	38%	38%	38%
extremely important	43%	32%	32%	28%
Q7G, Threat from abuses to human right				
somewhat important	30%	48%	45%	51%
very important	45%	32%	36%	34%
extremely important	26%	20%	19%	16%
Q8, Chance of nuclear war within 10 years				
likely	29%	17%	16%	16%
unlikely	59%	56%	57%	50%
very unlikely	12%	26%	27%	34%
Q12A, Nuclear weapons use in a Soviet surprise attack				
likely	26%	22%	16%	7%
unlikely	47%	48%	44%	46%
very unlikely	27%	30%	40%	47%
Q12B, Nuclear weapons use in Soviet WEuropean invasion				
likely	26%	32%	31%	17%
unlikely	58%	53%	48%	53%
very unlikely	17%	15%	21%	30%
Q12C, Nuclear weapons use by terrorists				
very likely	18%	27%	26%	21%
likely	58%	50%	52%	47%
unlikely	24%	23%	22%	32%
Q12E, Nuclear weapons use by superpowers over regional dispute				
likely	41%	32%	33%	25%
unlikely	53%	53%	48%	51%
very unlikely	6%	15%	20%	25%

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Table E3

	Income in thousands of $			
	10 to 20	20 to 35	35 to 60	60+
Q12E, Nuclear weapons use by superpowers over regional dispute				
likely	41%	32%	33%	25%
unlikely	53%	53%	48%	51%
very unlikely	6%	15%	20%	25%
Q18A, Strives for world domination				
bit more to US	24%	13%	21%	22%
equally to both	44%	44%	43%	35%
bit more to USSR	23%	29%	27%	26%
neither	9%	14%	10%	16%
Q18C, Trustworthy in negotiations				
bit more to US	30%	47%	35%	37%
equally to both	45%	37%	44%	44%
bit more to USSR	2%	3%	2%	6%
neither	22%	14%	19%	14%
Q18D, Uses military force to get its way				
bit more to US	13%	8%	8%	9%
equally to both	43%	36%	45%	46%
bit more to USSR	37%	46%	42%	41%
neither	6%	9%	5%	4%
Q20A, Soviet pursuit of influence				
content	44%	39%	40%	52%
trying to expand	56%	61%	60%	48%
Q21A, Do Soviet leaders want disarmament?				
do not	45%	56%	49%	30%
do	55%	44%	51%	70%

Canada, national survey - September-October 1989

Table E4

	Income in thousands of $			
	10 to 20	20 to 35	35 to 60	60+
Q21B, Do US leaders want disarmament?				
do not	63%	54%	58%	51%
do	37%	[illegible]	42%	49%
Q22F, Soviet leader Gorbachev				
very trustworthy	13%	9%	12%	18%
somewhat	64%	65%	62%	62%
not very	23%	26%	26%	19%
Q23, On comprehensive test ban, Canada should...				
actively promote it	55%	56%	63%	62%
quietly encourage US	36%	34%	23%	25%
not get involved	10%	10%	14%	14%
Q25A, Have you heard of NATO?				
yes	83%	86%	90%	97%
no	17%	14%	10%	3%
Q26, Canadian military involvement if WEurope is invaded				
would be justified	50%	59%	56%	67%
would not be	50%	41%	44%	33%
Q29B, Conventional war in Europe is impossible				
disagree	68%	60%	58%	54%
agree	32%	40%	42%	46%
Q29C, We can never abolish nuclear weapons				
disagree	12%	18%	13%	15%
agree	65%	51%	50%	52%
strongly agree	23%	32%	37%	33%

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Table E5

	Income in thousands of $			
	10 to 20	20 to 35	35 to 60	60+
Q29D, Close Canadian relations with both superpowers				
disagree	7%	14%	17%	28%
agree	57%	54%	47%	46%
strongly agree	36%	32%	36%	26%
Q29E, More independent European defence				
disagree	13%	27%	22%	26%
agree	73%	58%	66%	58%
strongly agree	13%	15%	13%	16%
Q29F, Disarmament may leave the West without deterrence				
strongly disagree	9%	10%	13%	20%
disagree	43%	50%	55%	49%
agree	48%	40%	32%	32%
Q29I, The USSR is a peace-loving nation				
strongly disagree	12%	17%	19%	15%
disagree	55%	49%	52%	53%
agree	32%	34%	29%	32%
Q36A, Do recent events mean Cold War is over?				
yes	2%	6%	10%	5%
no	21%	13%	13%	15%
is lessening	77%	82%	77%	80%
Q36B, Who has won the Cold War?				
West	4%	5%	5%	7%
Soviets	3%	1%	1%	1%
both	37%	49%	34%	41%
neither	57%	45%	60%	50%

Canada, national survey - September-October 1989

APPENDIX C

GRAPHS SHOWING COMPARISONS

Likelihood of War

FIGURE 1



QUESTION WORDING

1989:

Q8) Now thinking about nuclear war, within the next ten years, how likely do you think it is that there would be a nuclear war?

1988:

Now thinking about nuclear war, within the next twenty-five years, how likely do you think it is that there would be a nuclear war?

FIGURE 2



Legend

most important

second most important

least important

QUESTION WORDING

Q5) Please rank the three threats below from from the most serious threat facing Canadians at the present time internationally to the least serious threat facing Canada at the present time internationally.

Q6) Thinking about ten years from now, please rank the three threats below from the most serious threat facing Canada internationally to the least serious threat facing Canada internationally.

International Problems Affecting Canada's Security

FIGURE 3



QUESTION WORDING

Q7) Listed below are a number of international problems that may affect Canada's security. To what extent do you regard the importance of each international problem as a threat to Canada's security?

A) Global pollution problems
B) International crime such as drug trafficking
C) International financial and monetary instability
D) Spread of diseases internationally
E) World trade conflicts and protectionism
F) Terrorism
G) Major war
H) Abuses of human rights
I) Poverty and hunger in developing countries

N.B.: The answers on this graph are not arranged in the same order as in the questionnaire.

Figure 4
US and Soviet Pursuit of Influence



QUESTION WORDING

Q20) Is the Soviet Union [United States] more or less content with its power or influence in the world today, or is it trying to increase its area of influence?

FIGURE 5

Leaders' Desire for Disarmament

1987



1988



1989



QUESTION WORDING

Q21A) Some people believe that the Soviet leaders do not genuinely want disarmament. Other people believe that they do genuinely want disarmament. Which of these views is closest to you own?

Q21B) Some people believe that American leaders do not genuinely want disarmament. Other people belive that they do genuinely want disarmament. Which of these views is closest to your own?

FIGURE 6

Confident about Superpowers

1987



1988



1989



QUESTION WORDING

Q3A3) How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems?

Q3A6) How much confidence do you have in the ability of the Soviet Union to deal wisely with present world problems?

FIGURE 7 97

Trust in US and Soviet Leaders

1987



1988



1989



QUESTION WORDING

1989:

Q22) How trustworthy do you find the following leaders...American President George Bush? ...Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev?

1987 and 1988:

How trustworthy would you say President Reagan [Mr. Gorbachev] is on nuclear and arms control issues?